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REVISITING THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM: AN INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF U.S.-SPONSORED TERRORISM
DIRECTED TOWARD CUBA
Rick A. Matthews, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1994
Consistent with Herman's (1982) call to more critically examine
state-sponsored terrorism, this study assesses the sociopolitical
and economic context in which the U.S. has terrorized the nationstate of Cuba.

While the definitional framework in which the U.S.

has traditionally examined acts of terrorism excludes from it the
possibility of self incrimination, this research uses a single stan<lard and nondiscriminatory definition which examines the behavior in
question and harms done, as opposed to a definition based on power
considerations alone.

The method in which this research is conducted

is qualitative, consistent with the principles of a sociohistorical
case study, using an interdisciplinary approach.

Finally, the theo

retical approach is derived from institutional theory, rooted in the
critical paradigm of criminology.

The study concludes that the U.S.

sponsored terrorist activities directed toward Cuba have their gene
sis in the core values of the existing sociopolitical, economic, and
ideological arrangements in the U.S.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This research focusses on United States' foreign policy re
garding Cuba, which has taken the form of state-sponsored terrorism
since the Guevara- and Castro-led revolution in 1959.

Much of United

States' attention toward Cuba was marked by anti-communist sentiment,
and this foreign policy, in general, has taken the forms of subversion, militarism, assassination attempts, and attempts to overthrow
the Cuban government.
While the relationship between the United States and Cuba has
been the subject of much study, little work has addressed it within
the field of criminology 1 .

However, if one closely examines U.S.

foreign policy toward Cuba, it is difficult to differentiate its ef
fect from many of the social harms studied by critical criminolo
gists.

Much change has occurred within the critical study of crim

inology, with movement away from the use of traditional, state-based,
legalistic definitions of behavior to an analysis of patterns of
harmful behavior, patterns that are observed from the interpersonal
to the structural.

It is my contention that an analysis of U.S.

foreign policy toward Cuba is a logical extension of such analysis,
with a focus on structural patterns of behavior.
What is presented in this chapter is a brief review of changes
in critical criminology, focusing on the development of the crimes by

1

2

both extant and as I elaborate.

Subsequently, I will also examine

the state literature; as well as definitions of state criminality,
the legalistic framework by which the actions of the United States
toward Cuba could be considered criminal in nature.

This examination

will first address how the United States has used international law
to define others' actions as terrorist in nature, and then move to
ward a discussion of international law documents which define the
actions of the U.S. as terrorist in nature.
Finally, the methods by which this research will be conducted
will be discussed.

In short, this research will be conducted in a

manner consistent with a socio-historical case study.
Critical Criminology
Perhaps the most important research question which must be
considered by any criminologist is how to define what constitutes a
crime.

Naturally, the definition chosen is neither right or wrong,

but rather, useful or not.

The definition with which one begins,

however, does have consequences in influencing the questions and is
ues raised by the researcher.
Historically within the discipline of criminology there has
been a tendency to use state-defined criminal law as the mechanism by
which to define crime.

Therefore, the purview of past research has

been those acts or behaviors which violate criminal law.

Following

from this, a great deal of attention has been focussed on the nature,
extent, and distribution of what is commonly known as "street crime"
(e.g., juvenile delinquency, rape, murder, theft, ect.).

Moreover,
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the attempts to explain this phenomena over the past 30 years have
centered on social psychological explanations of crime, which include
the paradigms of social control and strain theory (Stitt & Giacopas
si, 1992).

Generally speaking, Stitt and Giacopassi (1992) are re

ferring to what is traditionally known as mainstream criminology.
Recently, mainstream criminology has been challenged by those
who claim that criminality is a label or legal status as opposed to a
type of behavior.

Most notably, these approaches have included the

labeling and conflict/power perspectives.

For these criminologists,

emphasis is placed not on examining individual behavior, but on the
definitional process, and how the status of criminal is ascribed by
those who create and administer criminal law.

In short, these

criminologists maintain that there is no such thing as an inherently
criminal act.
Quinney (1970), for example, argued that the definition of
crime itself is "a definition of human conduct that is created by
authorized agents in a politically organized society" and that "crim
inal definitions describe behaviors that conflict with the interests
of segments of society that have the power to shape public policy"
(pp. 15-16).

Therefore, the creation of criminal laws and cate

gories, the enforcement of these laws, and the functioning of the
criminal justice system are studied with reference to the transforma
tion of persons into criminals, and behaviors into crimes.

The is

sues of crime and crime control, according to Barak (1994), are
therefore "subject to a myriad of questions and interpretations"

4
(p. 5).

These questions and interpretations which Barak (1994) refers
to do not necessarily mean that those who reject the mainstream ap
However, the type of beha

proach are not concerned with behavior.

vior these criminologists are concerned with may or may not be con
sidered criminal under state-defined law.

For example, those working

outside the mainstream paradigm who study street crime, may base
their work in broader theoretical traditions which examine structural, sociopolitical, institutional or economic factors in their attempt to explain a specific behavior.

While some criminologists use

alternative theoretical traditions to examine state-defined criminal
acts, others may be likely to focus on other behavior, such as white
collar crimes, political crimes, corporate crimes, and a wide variety
of behaviors which may not be ascribed the status of crimes under
state-defined law.

Indeed, these criminologists often use other

mechanisms (such as international law, or human rights documents) to
classify a wider variety of behavior as criminal for the purposes of
study.

Those criminologists who either reject the notion that cer

tain acts are intrinsically criminal in and of themselves and/or use
alternative mechanisms other than state-defined criminal law to clas
sify behavior as criminal fall within what is known as the critical
paradigm.
Although the debate over inherently criminal acts is a breaking
point between the mainstream and critical paradigms, there are sev
eral more specific distinctions which can be made between the two.
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First, the mainstream paradigm assumes that the mechanism they use to
define criminal acts (i.e., state-defined criminal law) is based on
consensus.

The consensus of law, for mainstream criminologists, is

grounded in the assumption that there is consensus in the moral val
ues of society, either through a collective conscience or a social
contract.

Therefore, the issues of law, crime, order, and justice

are givens, for the mainstream criminologist, and they generally do
not examine anything other than individual behavior which violates
state-defined laws.

Critical criminologists, as mentioned earlier,

do not accept the assumption that state-defined criminal law is based
on consensus, but rather on power considerations and conflict.

These

criminologists therefore turn, in some cases, to alternative mecha
nisms (e.g., human rights laws, or international law) to classify
behavior as criminal for the purposes of study.
The second specific point of departure between the mainstream
and critical paradigm is related to how criminal behavior is explain
ed.

The mainstream paradigm, for example, is rooted in the classical

and positivist schools of thought.

The classical and positivist

schools of thought represent the dichotomy of human behavior as
either being free-willed (classicalism), or determined (positivism).
For example, mainstream theories within the positivist school include
biological, psychological, social disorganization theories, and
social control theories, to name a few.

The central unifying theme

throughout theses theories is the emphasis on deterministic elements,
whether they are intrinsic or external.

On the other hand,
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mainstream criminologists from the classical school view human be
havior in terms of rational choice.

Therefore, criminal behavior is

the end result of an individual rationally calculating the benefits
of carrying out a crime with those consequences of being caught.
Rather than viewing behavior in terms of being entirely
determined (positivism) or based solely on rational choice (class
icalism), critical criminologists often view human beings as subject
to, and makers of those structures and institutions which ultimately
constrain them (Barak, 1994).

Therefore, critical criminologists do

not take an overly deterministic or free-will stance in their attempt
to explain behavior.

In this light, then, it is entirely possible

for the critical criminologist to give consideration to both deter
minism and free-will.
Finally, Barak (1994) cites that critical criminologists do not
believe that the value-neutral or objective study of social pheno
menon is possible.

In short, the critical paradigm rejects the

assertion of the positivists that social research may be objective,
maintaining that ideological, institutional or moral influences upon
the researcher make this impossible.
Having distinguished the critical from the mainstream paradigm,
it should be noted here that neither the critical or the mainstream
approach are necessarily correct in and of themselves.

Rather, each

paradigm defines a set of assumptions that the criminologist will be
working from; whether doing research and/or creating theory.

From

this, these assumptions are neither right or wrong, but only an
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epistemological/philosophical starting point at which one begins
examining the social world around us.

With this in mind, it should

be stated that this research will be conducted in a manner consistent
with the critical perspective, focussing specifically on the histor
ical sociopolitical context in which U.S. government agencies have
engaged in state-sponsored terrorism against Cuba.

Ultimately, this

research will focus on criminal behavior on the United States, par
ticularly at the organizational level.

In the meanwhile, I will

briefly examine the development of the subject matter of white col
lar crime which has eventually led to the exploration of state crime.
White Collar Crime and Beyond
Recently, some criminologists have shifted their focus away
from discussions of criminal behavior to larger issues of criminal
ity, which have included studies of white collar crimes (Clinard &
Quinney, 1973; Schrager & Short, 1978; Sutherland, 1949), corporate
crimes (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Cullen, Maakestad, & Cavender, 1987;
Hills, 1987; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987), occupational crimes (Cole
man, 1989), and political crimes (Caulfield & Wonders, 1993; Tunnell,
1993; Turk, 1982).

More recently, constructs of state-corporate

crimes have been introduced (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1993; Kramer,
1992). Following from this, others (Barak, 1990, 1991; Chambliss,
1989) have used white collar crime as a segue to reach yet another
level of inquiry, which Chambliss (1989) called state-organized
crime.
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Barak (1990) has argued that the incorporation of state crimes
within the boundaries of criminological investigation is the "logi
cal extension of the inclusion of the behaviors of white-collar and
corporate offenders into the traditional boundaries of criminologi
cal inquiry" (p. 272).

With the exception of Barak (1990, 1991),

Chambliss (1989), and Grabosky (1989), there have been few noteworthy
works within the field of criminology which have specifically ad
dressed the issue of state criminality.
Defining State Criminality
State crime can take a variety of forms, ranging from the theft
of constitutional rights by agents of the state, such as with the
C0INTELPR0 program waged by the FBI against numerous dissenting
groups (see, e.g., Caulfield, 1991; Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990;
Davis, 1992), to the intentional violation of international law,
whereby one nation-state engages in harm-producing action against
another nation-state, as with U.S. action against Cuba.

As Barak

(1991) notes,

"crimes by the state . . . are usually far more subtle

and covert. .

. [However], as contemporary data and analysis reveal

. crimes by the state are more lethal and destructive than more
traditional crimes committed against the state" (pp. 4-6).
In attempting to operationalize state criminality, there have
generally been three competing arguments.

The first type of argument

centers around what has been commonly called a social harms perspec
tive.

Scholars using the social harms perspective have attempted to
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transcend legalistic state definitions of crime in an attempt to
place socially harmful acts which are not defined as crimes within
the boundaries of criminological inquiry.

Schwendinger and Schwen

dinger (1970), Barak (1990, 1991), Sellin (1938) and Tifft and Sul
livan (1980) have all noted that the problem with limiting crimin
nological investigation to categories of state defined criminal law
lies in the fact that these laws often reflect the interests of those
individuals creating law.

As Kennedy (1970) notes, there has been a

historical tendency for certain groups to define their own behavior
as being beyond incrimination.

Following from this, behaviors by the

powerful, with consequences often far more severe than that of street
crime, are generally excluded from consideration in the criminal law.
With regard to terrorism, for instance, Herman (1987) notes that
those in power define terms such as terrorism to exclude not only
their own actions, but also the actions of their friends and client
states.

This consistent theme suggests that state defined criminal

law, as constructed, is an inappropriate forum for the reduction of
harm, due its inability to address all harmful behaviors.
However, these efforts to move outside the state definition of
crime have been met with resistance from those who claim that social
harms perspectives reflect nothing more than researchers' personal
moral agenda (Shapiro, 1983).

Others, such as Braithwaite (1985),

have been more vehement in denouncing this approach.
(1985)

Braithwaite

claims that "those who choose to study violations of

'politically defined human rights"' will deserve to be ignored for
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"indulging their moralities in a social science that has no rele
vance for those who do not share that morality" (p. 18).
Be that as it may, as Michalowski and Kramer (1987) point out,
neither the legalistic nor the social harms perspective provides
clear guidance regarding why one should be chosen over the other.
Furthermore, the contrast between the social harms and legalistic
perspectives appears to be quite sharp.

On one hand you have those

who choose to dismiss the legalistic constructs of crime in favor of
expanding the scope of inquiry to include socially harmful behavior
which may not fall under any definition of criminal law.

On the

other hand are those such as Braithwaite (1985) who dismiss any at
tempt to transcend legally defined criminal law as being moralistic.
Seeing as the traditional approach is no more value-free and object
ive, or less moralistic than a social harms approach, Braithwaite's
(1985) argument falls short.

More importantly, an examination of

international law can include both perspectives, as it focuses on
legalistic criteria which incorporates activities not generally
considered criminal under nation-state specific law.

Which brings

me to the third perspective, the international law approach.
The international law perspective attempts to ameliorate this
definitional problem, suggesting that criminologists turn to broader
constructs of criminal behavior based on principles of human rights
as defined by various international treaties and covenants (e.g.,
Barak, 1990, 1991, 1994; Tifft & Sullivan, 1980).

This approach is

particularly sound when the nation-state in question has codified the
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covenant or treaty.
The issue as to whether or not the actions of the powerful or,
as I address, the activities of nation-states should fall under
criminological scrutiny can be addressed by first asking the question
of whether or not these actions violate some form of international
law.

In answering this question, the demonstration of the existence

of a set of codified and legally binding principles which govern the
interaction of states certainly advances the argument that states
are, in fact, subject to law.

Barak (1990) echoes this sentiment by

stating that criminologists should look to higher criteria, such as
international laws, covenants, and treaties when studying the harm
ful behaviors of nation-states.

This approach allows the researcher

to use a set of codified and internationally recognized standards to
classify behavior as criminal in nature.

In short, the use of in

ternational law allows the researcher to transcend narrowly defined
state law, (which usually does not recognize its own behavior as
criminal in nature), placing the activities of a state within the
boundaries of criminological inquiry.
International Criminal Law and Terrorism
With regard to international criminal law, there are several
codified covenants and treaties which strictly prohibit the use of
international terrorism, either by individuals or by nation-states.
The specific documents I will examine here which legally prohibit
acts of international terrorism include the Charter of the
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Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations' Declara
ion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, and the United Nations' Charter.2
With reference to the OAS Charter, the 18th and 21st articles
prohibit unwarranted acts of aggression such as terrorism, although
the word terrorism is not explicit in either article.

For instance,

article 18 of the OAS (cited in Ball, 1969) states that
no state or group of states has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also
any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements (p. 617).
Additionally, article 18 of the OAS Charter prohibits armed
force in state interference, and article 21 (Ball, 1969) specifically
states "the American States bind themselves in their international
relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the
case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in
fulfillment thereof" (p. 617).
Clearly, articles 18 and 21 of the OAS Charter bind member
states in an agreement of non-violence, except in self defense.
Additionally, the cultural, political, and economic elements of the
member states of the OAS are clearly sovereign.

The sovereignty of

OAS member states certainly questions the authority of the U.S. to
intervene in Cuba's political and economic affairs, particularly in
the light of anti-communist fervor which has historically been used
to legitimize U.S. terrorism directed towards Cuba.

Finally, the
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element of non-intervention found in article 18 provides guidance as
to the legitimacy of U.S. aggression toward Cuba over the past
thirty-five years.

Clearly, the U.S. does not have the legal author

ity, according to the OAS Charter, to intervene in the political,
economic or cultural affairs of Cuba.
While the OAS Charter is a regional one which encompasses the
nations of North America, Central America, the Caribbean, and South
America, the United Nations is more global in scope.

According to

the Charter of the United Nations (Riggs & Plano, 1994), all member
states are obligated by Article 1 to "maintain international peace
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace"
(p. 314).

Indeed, the Charter of the United Nations, according to

Riggs and Plano (1994), attempts to promote peace among its member
states, as clearly defined by article 51 which states that the use
of force is legitimate only in member states' "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security" (p. 324).

Once again, it is clear that the use of force

is justified only in acts of self defense, and that the sovereignty
of nation-states is to be respected by all members of the United
Nations.
According to Lahey and Sang (1975), the United Nations'
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Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States affirms that "no state may use
or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure
from it advantages of any kind" (p. 202).

Furthermore, as Lahey and

Sang (1975) note, this article also specifies that "no state shall
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive,
terrorist, or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow
of the regime of another state" (p. 202).
Certainly, the United Nations' Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States prohibits the use of terrorism, and seemingly, provides clear
guidance as to whether or not U.S. aggression toward Cuba is, in
fact, considered legal under international law.

However, as dis

ussed previously, the issue of clear legal guidance as to what is and
is not terrorism has become twisted in the interpretation of the law
through the ideologically-tainted lenses of U.S. officials, as the
words terrorism and terror, according to Mallison and Mallison
(1975), "are not words which refer to a well defined and clearly
identified set of factual events" (p. 67).

As Mallison and Mallison

(1975) add, terrorism and terror do not have "any widely accepted
meaning in legal doctrine" (p. 67).

With this in mind, I will now

examine the double standard the U.S. has embraced when condemning
acts of state-sponsored terrorism with reference to international
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law.
Terrorism by Any Other Name
According to Shank (1987), "terrorism has been condemned by
the world's nations as a criminal act" (p. 61).

The United States'

condemnation of terrorism as a criminal act was quite evident in
former President Reagan's war on terrorism which he began shortly
after the inception of his first term.

This war on terrorism, how

ever, would take a particular form, a form not at all consistent
across either actions or consequences.

Herman (1982), refers to

terrorist actions waged by nation-states, usually directed at
independence or revolutionary movements as wholesale terrorism.

Re

tail terrorism, according to Herman (1982) refers to those terrorist
acts committed against governments by independence or revolutionary
movements.

Herman's (1987) distinction between wholesale and retail

terrorism is critical in application here in that the war on terror
ism was primarily concerned with retail terrorism, while ignoring the
much larger issue of wholesale terrorism, particularly the wholesale
terrorist activities the U.S. had engaged in.

For example, U.S.

foreign policy, throughout the latter half of the 20th century,
consisted of both overt and covert forms of terrorism.

Overt action

consisted of events such as the U.S. military air strikes against
Libya.

The more insidious forms of terrorism, however, were covert

and, as the Iran-Contra hearings demonstrated, without democratical
ly approved support.

Covert activities initiated by the CIA included
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the overthrow of Chile's Allende, U.S. action to denationalize Bra
zilian industry, and a host of other activities throughout the Wes
tern Hemisphere.

These latter actions include U.S. aggression toward

the nation-states of Central America; most notably, Nicaragua and El
Salvador.
Interestingly, forms of international law are supposedly design
ed to protect nation-states from such intervention.

Former Secretary

of State George Shultz (as cited in Shank, 1987) claimed that the law
is
a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its
maximum extent. . . A state which supports terrorist or
subversive attacks against another state, or which supports
or encourages terrorist planning and other activities within
its own territory, is respon- sible for such attacks. Such
conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against
the other state under international law (p. 51).
The semantics surrounding the word terrorism are quite fasci
nating indeed.

In the traditional sense, terrorism, according to

Herman (1982), refers to "a mode of governing or of opposing govern
ment, by intimidation" (p. 21; emphasis in original). In terms of
U.S. policy, however, terrorism refers to only those acts of warfare
committed against democratic states by totalitarian regimes, which is
clearly illustrated in how Shultz (as cited in Shank, 1987) defined
the parameters of who is and is not a terrorist when he claimed that
we do not practice terrorism and we seek to build a world
which holds no place for terrorist violence, a world in
which human rights are respected by all governments, a world
based on the rule of law. . . If freedom and democracy are
the targets of terrorism,it is clear that totalitarianism is
its ally (pp. 42-43).
Indeed, the placement of terrorism within the boundaries of
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international law has been commonplace for the United States govern
ment over the past 15 years.

Former President Ronald Reagan, for

example, stated in a speech given to the American Bar Association in
1985, that he considered the governments of five countries as culp
able in engaging in what he called serious state terrorism (Herman,
Moreover, both former presidents Reagan and Bush would call

1987).

upon international law when it would benefit the U.S. as nation
state, which was well evidenced by the air-strikes carried out by the
U.S. against Libya.

In the case of the air-strikes against Libya,

for example, the U.S. claimed its activities were justifiable under
article 51_ of the United Nations Charter, as the U.S. was exercising
its right to self defense through preemptive counterterrorist measures.
Although it is often said that governments respond to terrorism
with counterterrorism, counterterrorism is still a form of terrorism.
Nowhere is this fact more evident than in National Security Directive
(NSDD) 138 which was implemented by former President Ronald Reagan to
justify the air-strikes on Libya.

NSDD 138 stated that the United

States could, in fact, use preemptive strikes on known terrorist
groups (Shank, 1987).
However, the willingness of the United States to use preemp
tive, or counterterrorist measures, as was claimed, was in violation
of international law.

As Shank (1987) notes, the Reagan administra

tion used this appeal to international law in an attempt
. to satisfy the need to legitimate its unilateral armed
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interventions to the NATO powers, to assuage world opinion,
and to avoid destablizing an international system which has,
after all, made possible the mechanism of unequal exchange,
a process favoring the accumulation of capital in the imper
ial centers. In practice, however, the administration shows
no interest in acting in accord with international law, pre
ferring instead to rationalize its actions in accord with
its perceived national security interests (p. 49).
Shank's (1987) analysis of NSDD 138, as well as the Reagan
administration's attempts of rationalizing its own terrorist poli
cies, is particularly insightful in the larger historical context of
U.S. sponsored terrorism.

Indeed, the United States has rarely exam

ined its own policies with reference to international law, except in
those instances in which this law was on its side.
In summary, then, the definitional debate between the legal
istic and social harms approach may be ameliorated by turning to an
international law perspective.

Using international law as the mech

anism to classify behavior as criminal for the purposes of study is
the approach which will be taken in this thesis.

As I have already

noted, there are numerous codified treaties which obligates members
to refrain from using terrorist acts against others.

However, there

is a great deal of hypocrisy by U.S. officials when examining the
actions of the U.S. in this same light.

Before moving to a more

comprehensive operationalization of terrorism for the purposes of
this study, I will revisit the issue of the theoretical framework in
which I will be working.
An Institutional Approach for Studying State Crimes
While this research will focus on the role of various U.S.
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governmental agencies (particularly the CIA) and their criminal
sponsoring of terrorist acts against Cuba, little attention will
be given to the individual actors responsible for these crimes.
Rather than focussing on attributing proximate personal blame for
these crimes, this research will be concerned with what others out
side the discipline of criminology (e.g., Albert, 1994; Chomsky,
1992a, 1992b; and Herman, 1982) have termed an institutional theory.
In using an institutional approach, this research will focus on
systemic causes of trends and events.

For example, Chapter II will

examine the manner in which terrorism has been defined by the U.S.
and its client states, paying particular attention to the role of
ideology and the avoidance of self incrimination.

Chapter III,

furthermore, will emphasize the historical, political and economic
context in which these crimes were committed.

While it is true that

the crimes and actors responsible for them will be discussed in Chap
ter III in relation to a specific definitional framework of terror
ism, they will be explained as facts needing explanation as opposed
to explanations in and of themselves.

Indeed, the primary reason I

have opted not to focus on the individual actors is that these crimes
have persisted for nearly 35 years.

It would be difficult at best to

generate any theory as to the longevity of these crimes considering
the turnover in individuals within these organizations.

Quite simp

ly, there has been a constant assault on Cuba which has outlived
(quite literally in some cases) the actors responsible for creating
the initial policy directives.

Therefore, I will examine the
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sociopolitical and economic pressures on these organizations which
have given rise to these crimes.
Albert (1994) succinctly summarizes the approach of an insti
tutional theory.

Albert (1994) states that

in an institutional theory, personalities and personal
motivations enter the discussion only.as a result of
more basic factors. The personal actions culminating
in some event do not serve as explanation. The theory
explains phenomena via roles, incentives, and dynamics
of underlying institutions. An institutional theory
doesn't ignore human actions, but the point of an insti
tutional explanation is to move from personal factors
to institutional ones. If the particular people hadn't
been there to do it, someone else would have (p. 85).
The institutional factors which have been pertinent to this
research center around the context in which the CIA was created,
particularly the role of the Cold War, and economics.

Indeed, I will

demonstrate in Chapter III that the Castro/Guevara led revolution in
Cuba provided the context in which the institutional goals of the
U.S. (read: investment climate) were threatened to the degree that
the CIA was given carte blanche to wage a terrorist campaign against
Cuba.

Furthermore, I will argue that the CIA itself is an organiza

tion whose means in accomplishing their goals with respect to Cuba
(read: the removal of Castro from power) were illegal.

In the

meanwhile, however, I will address the methodology by which this
research will be conducted.
Methods
This section presents the methodology by which this research
will be conducted.

The approach to this research will be a
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socio-historical case study of terrorism directed towards Cuba by the
United States government.

Yin's (1989) definition of a case study

will guide this research.

Yin (1989) defines a case study as "an

empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within
its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly defined; and in which multiple data sources
are used" (p. 23).
The real-life context which Yin (1989) speaks of includes both
temporal and spatial elements. Placing these events within their
proper spatial and temporal context creates a continuum which Yin
(1989) calls a chain of evidence.

It is this chain of evidence which

will allow me to investigate current and past U.S. violations of
international law which are relevantly positioned in time and space.
Temporally, 1959 to the present is the period within which
transgressions against Cuba will be examined.

Nineteen fifty-nine is

an important starting date because this was the year in which Batista
fled Cuba and Castro's revolutionary forces seized control.

Castro's

revolution occurred in the height of anti-communist sentiment, in
the years immediately following the Korean War, the McCarthy era, and
the height of the Cold War.

Since this time, the United States has

engaged in a number of actions which violate international law,
culminating in the 1992 United Nations' condemnation of the U.S.
economic embargo placed on Cuba which has been in effect since 1964.
Spatially, the Castro and Guevara revolution established a
communist state a mere 90 miles from Key West, Florida.

The fear by
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U.S. officials that the establishment of a communist state in such
close proximity to the U.S. led the U.S. to take many measures
attempting to contain further hemispheric infection (U.S. Senate,
1975).

The 1961 CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, which occurred

only two years after Castro's revolution, is just one example of many
illegal U.S. actions attempted to contain Cuban communism.

Indeed,

many U.S. actions cited throughout this study were often delineated
by the United States as preventative anti-communist inoculation mea
sures during the Cold War.
Triangulation and Data Sources
In this study, triangulation will be used in both the theory
and data.

Denzin (1989) defines four types of triangulation: (1) da

ta triangulation, which has three subtypes--time, space and person;
(2) investigator triangulation which includes the use of multiple
observers; (3) methodological triangulation which can entail within
method triangulation and between method triangulation; (4) theory
triangulation which consists of multiple rather than single perspec
tives in relation to the same set of objects (p. 237).
Of these four triangulation methods, only data and theory
triangulation will be used in this thesis.

Investigator triangula

tion will not be used as I am the sole investigator on this project.
The reason why methodological triangulation will not be used lies in
the fact that I have opted to use the methods consistent with those
of a qualitatively based historical case study.
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The use of theoretical triangulation is warranted since there
is sparse criminological literature pertinent to the issue of U.S.
terrorism directed towards Cuba.

In addition to the previously

mentioned criminological theory, I will also use the theoretical
works of Chomsky (1982, 1985, 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), Herman
(1982, 1987), Chomsky and Herman (1979), and Purdue (1989).

In mak

ing use of interdisciplinary theoretical models to explain this
phenomenon, I hope to, as Denzin (1989) states, widen the theoretical
framework as empirical materials are interpreted.

Data triangulation

will be used in this study with reference to the sources used.

The

data used in this study will include government documents, interna
tional documents, secondary accounts, and finally, recent secondary
analysis.

Data from government documents will primarily be drawn

from State Department releases and Senate Hearing reports.

Inter

national documents will include United Nations treaties and charters,
and regional charters such as the OAS.

Secondary accounts will in

clude interviews with former CIA officials and operatives, as well as
statements made by former presidents of the United States, and Che
Guevara.

Recent secondary analysis will include the works of Chomsky

(1982, 1985, 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), Herman (1982, 1987), and Falk
(1988).
In summary, then, this research will examine U.S. state
sponsored terrorism directed at Cuba from 1959 to the present.

The

method by which this research will be conducted will be consistent
with that of a socio-historical case study as defined by Yin (1989).
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The theoretical approach guiding this research will rely on a cri
tical perspective, defining state-sponsored terrorism as the viola
tion of international law.

Finally, although the behaviors of cer

tain individuals may be used for the purpose of fully understanding
what has occurred, no attempt will be made to proximate personal
blame.

From this, emphasis will be placed on the functioning of the

organization(s) in question.

I will, however, use an institutional

approach to examine the sociopolitical and economic factors which
have influenced these events.

In short, the level of analysis will

focus on organizational behavior and the institutions which have
influenced these behaviors.

What follows in the next chapter is the

operationalization of terrorism for the purposes of this research, as
well as an examination of Herman's (1987) mechanisms of state
sponsored terrorism.

CHAPTER II
DEFINING TERRORISM
Terrorism; What Is It?

The Reader Wants to Know

In an attempt to more critically examine the specifics of what
terrorism is, Herman (1982) advances the argument that there are, in
fact, two types of terrorism:

wholesale and retail.

Wholesale ter

rorism, according to Herman (1982), refers to terrorist actions waged
by nation-states, usually directed at independence or revolutionary
movements.

Retail terrorism, on the other hand, refers to the com

monly accepted definition of terrorism, which includes such groups as
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Red Brigade, Irish
Republican Army (IRA), African National Congress (ANC) or the Nicara
guan Sandanistas.

As Herman (1982) correctly notes, there is a

tremendous difference between these types of terrorism, both in terms
of the resources available to those so labeled, as well as the per
ceived extent of involvement in terrorism.

The activities of

organizations such as the PLO, IRA, Red Brigade, and Sandanistas are
unequivocally denounced by the United States, while terrorist activi
ties supported by democratic nation-states such as the United States
go virtually unnoticed (e.g., U.S. support of the Contras in their
terrorist actions against the Sandanistas).

As Barak (1990) points

out, there has been a selective examination of terrorism, a selectiv
ity which "refers not only to countries emphasized and neglected, but
25
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to the various forms of terrorism committed" (p. 14).
Certainly, ideology plays a crucial role in who is or is not
defined as a terrorist.

Purdue (1989) notes that the ideological war

on terrorism has been closely linked to anticommunist sentiment. A
passage from the Senate Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the
Judiciary (1975, cited in Purdue, 1989) is particularly insightful,
as they state that
in previous hearings, it has been established that the
Communists, despite their repeated declarations that
they do not engage in terrorist activities, do in fact
provide training and logistical and financial support for
terrorist groups...This is true of the Moscow Communists,
the Maoists, the Trotskyists and the Castro Communists.
Indeed, a majority of those groups which are actively en
gaged in terrorism consider themselves Marxist-Leninists
of some kind (p. 11).
Thus, according to the United States Senate, the reader is
asked to consider that the majority of terrorist activities are fi
nanced and supported by Marxist-Leninists.

However, this narrowly

construed and ideologically motivated definition of terrorism paints
terrorism as something which comes primarily from fragmented groups
of individuals supported by communist governments.

Furthermore, the

ideological framework in which the United States has defined terror
ism excludes its own activities, as well as the activities of its
client states from consideration.

Purdue (1989) notes that the term

terrorism, as well as its negative connotation, is often emphasized
when discussing the alleged activities of those possessing enemy
ideologies.
As Chomsky (1992b) notes, there are two things which define
terrorism, "first it's done against states, not by states against
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their citizens, and its done by them, not by us" (p. 50, emphasis
added).

Herman (1987) notes that the actions of the ANG, IRA, PLO

and other traditionally defined terrorist groups are often done in
the context of reacting to state-sponsored repression.

However,

actions by the state directed at groups of individuals, which are
often more harmful, are not defined as terrorism.
Certainly, there is difficulty in formulating a single defini
tion of the word terrorism which is acceptable to everyone, as one
person's freedom fighter may be considered a terrorist by others.
Indeed, what is called terrorism seems to be dependent upon one's
point of view.

Certainly, actions such as car bombings, airplane hi

jackings, assassination attempts, kidnapping, mail bombs and the tak
ing of hostages are acts which are, generally speaking, condemned by
all.

However, these activities encompass only a fraction of all

terrorist acts and harms, particularly if one considers broader
definitions which move beyond sensationalized stereotypes of terrorism.
As mentioned earlier, similar actions with similar consequences
are not always given the same label.

Jenkins (1974) points out that

the use of the word terrorism often "implies a moral judgement, and
if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral
viewpoint" (p. 14).

Jenkins (1974) then adds that "each nation wants

to proscribe, and therefore define international terrorism in a way
that will include those acts which it considers terrorism -
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particularly those for which it may be a likely target" (p. 21).
Purdue (1989) adds that, "ultimately, terrorism is a label of
defamation, a means of excluding those so branded from human stand
ing. . . it is a means of organizing both the perceptions and re
actions of others in the world community" (p. 4).
Jenkins (1974) notes that the United States has consistently
resisted definitions of terrorism in international law which move
beyond what Herman (1982) has termed retail terrorism, and has gen
erally worked to maintain a narrowly defined, ideologically tainted
construct of terrorism which excludes the actions of the United
States and its client states.

For example, according to Bassiouni

(1975), in 1972 the United States submitted the United States Draft
Convention For the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
International Terrorism to the United Nations General Assembly.
According to this Draft Convention submitted by the United States,
the actions of governments committed towards its citizenry, and the
actions of governments directed at the citizenry of other nations is
not explicitly prohibited.

This Draft Convention, furthermore, ad

dresses terrorism in terms of individuals committing various acts
such as kidnapping, murder, or the causation of serious bodily harm
against another government's officials.
For purposes of this thesis, I will use the definition of ter
rorism provided by the government of Haiti to the United Nations Gen
eral Assembly.

According to Jenkins (1974), the government of Haiti

proposed that "any threat or act of violence committed by a person or
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group of persons on foreign territory or in any other place under
international jurisdiction against any person with a view to achiev
ing a political objective" be considered a terrorist act (p. 22).

As

Jenkins (1974) points out, "this is also a fair definition of war"
(p. 22).
Naturally, when terrorism is broadly defined as such, the im
mediate inclination is, by some, to reject such definitions outright,
particularly if such a definition encompasses acts in which they have
historically engaged.

Purdue (1989) astutely observes that it is

"plausible that a Habermas-style legitimation crisis may result if
and when forms of state violence are redefined as institutional
terrorism" (p. 8).

Quite simply, terrorist acts committed by nation

states which are cloaked as counter-terrorism may face, as Purdue
(1989) notes, "broad-scale rejection" when the state is no longer
able to maintain a false distinction between the two (p. 8).
In terms of the amount of harm done by various acts, however,
Mallison and Mallison (1975) note that the use of military tactics
such as aerial bombardment during times of war, "causes much greater
terror than the efforts of non-governmental terrorists" (p. 82).
Speaking on the issue of aerial bombardment as a form of terrorism,
Ambassador Charles W. Yost (cited in Mallison & Mallison, 1975)
stated that there has been a historical double standard in that
when the Nazis bombed Warsaw or Rotterdam or Coventry,
we called it "terror-bombing", but when we bomb North
or South Vietnam we call it "protective reaction." Yet
we are killing incomparably more people, including more
wholly innocent civilians, than the Palestinian terror-
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ists have killed in all these years. The fact is, of
course, that there is a vast amount of hypocrisy on the
subject of political terrorism. We all righteously con
demn it - except when we ourselves or friends are engag
ing in it. Then we ignore it or gloss it over or attach
to it tags like "liberation" or "defense of the free
world" or "national honor" to make it seem something other
than it is (p. 83).
While a complete analysis of the connections between terrorism
and war are beyond the scope of this thesis, there are several rea
sons why I have chosen to operationalize terrorism in a manner which
is consistent with the principle of aerial bombings and war.

First

and foremost, the language which is used in traditional Western de
finitions of terrorism (particularly by the United States) excludes
the concept of states committing terrorist acts against civilians.
As Chomsky (1992b) notes, this was not always the case, and terror
ism, during the 18th century, was reserved for violent states which
committed violent acts against its or other states' citizens.

How

ever, the perpetrators and victims of the word terrorism have become
inverted in recent history, and the word terrorism has not been used
in its original meaning.

Second, a broader definition of terrorism

places similar actions and consequences together in an attempt to
sort through the semantics of Western definitions of terrorism, and
call things what they really are.

Chomsky (1992b) notes that

language is, after all, a tool for thought. If you debase
the language, you debase the thought. I don't want to
exaggerate this element of it, but it is one element, and
one that's certainly consciously manipulated in order to
introduce confusion and lack of perception. (pp. 49-50)
Third, as Mallison and Mallison (1975) note, the language used
to define who and who is not a victim of terrorism, as well as a
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continued double standard in the use of the word terrorism, may have
racist implications.
Mallison and Mallison (1975) note that "the Vietnamese, and
other South-East Asians, along with the Palestinians, and other
South-West Asians as well as North Africans are functionally the pre
sent day North American Indians" (p. 83).

Mallison and Mallison

(1975) then add that
they may be killed with impunity and without suggestion
of guilt. The same treatment applied to European set
tlers or their descendants, such as the white Rhodesians
or the Zionists in Palestine, would be regarded as geno
cide (p. 84).
With respect to the historical treatment of Native Americans
within the U.S., Takaki (1993) notes that the "colonists quickly
justified their violence by demonizing their enemies" (p. 43).

How-

ever, the transference of one's own negative tendencies to another
group is not something new.

While Native Americans were seen as un

ruly, "God-less" savages, Takaki (1993) notes that the atrocities
committed by the civilized whites against the Native Americans, were,
in fact savage.

It is in this light, then, that Native Americans be

came an enemy worthy of indiscriminate killing.

In much the same

manner, the indiscriminate killing of the "God-less" communists of
South East Asia was also justified.

Finally, Purdue (1989) states

"expressed polemically, the good guys are free enterprisers, demo
cratic, Christian, and civilized.

The bad guys are communists,

Marxists, Islamic fundamentalists and assorted crazies" (p. 9).
short, terrorism is a term reserved for what the bad guys do.

In
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Fourth, Herman (1987) notes that the actions of terrorists are
often portrayed as indiscriminate (or random) killings in which no
concern is given to whether or not the victims are innocent bystand
ers.

Herman (1987) states that "this is presumably less moral than

non-random killing, and the claim is used to lend an aura of evil to
terrorist and benignness to the other (frequently) state killers"
(p. 4).

Certainly, if one uses the amount of indiscriminate killing

as a measure of

terrorism, the definition provided by the Haitian

government makes the indiscriminate carpet bombings conducted over
rural South-East Asia during the Vietnam War acts of terrorism as
well.
Finally, the definition of terrorism provided by the Haitian
government provides both a comprehensive single standard, as well
as a nondiscriminatory conception of terrorism which defines terror
ism in terms of acts committed and harms done, as opposed to a de
finition based on power alone.
What follows is a discussion of Herman's (1987) mechanisms of
terrorism.

Herman's (1987) concern is with four conceptual mechan

isms of terrorism, which are: (1) supplying repression, (2) subver
sion, (3) invasion, and (4) rehabilitating fascists.

Although the

activities of the CIA with respect to Cuba fall neatly into only
three of Herman's (1987) categories of state-sponsored terrorism
(i.e., supplying repression, subversion and invasions), I will
briefly discuss all four mechanisms of state-sponsored terrorism in
the following section. However, the fourth category, rehabilitating
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fascists, will not be discussed in the application in Chapter III,
as I have found little evidence of this occurring with regards to
CIA involvement in Cuba.

Having said this, I will discuss Herman's

(1987) mechanisms of state-sponsored terrorism in the order listed, as
the degree of overt involvement increases from supplying repression to
actual invasions.
The Mechanisms of Terrorism
The typical image of a terrorist, as depicted by U.S. media
coverage, is usually that of an individual working to advance the
cause of an extremist group.

The tools of destruction for these

individuals are often bombs placed in locations where innocent per
ons are likely to be injured.

However, as Herman (1982) notes, these

are the images and actions of retail terrorists.

The mechanisms of

terrorism for retail terrorists, according to Herman (1987) kill les
er amounts of people using less technologically advanced methods.
Herman (1987) states that wholesale terrorists on the other hand,
have vast amounts of resources, person-power, and technologically
advanced equipment to kill or harm far greater numbers of people than
their retail terrorist counterparts.

While the image of a retail

terrorist bombing incites fear in most, the methods of state
sponsored terrorism have gone largely unnoticed.

The mechanisms by

which nation-states engage in terrorist activities, according to Her
man (1987) include the use of any or all of the following categories:
supplying repression, subversion, invasions and rehabilitating
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fascists.

Although these mechanisms often have substantial overlap

and are often used in concert, I will discuss each one in turn with
regard to their distinguishing characteristics.
Supplying repression, as defined by Herman (1987), encompasses
"the buildup, financing, arming, and training of Third World police,
intelligence, and military personnel" (p. 13).

With respect to Cuba,

these activities include supplying Cuban dissidents with the mater
ials necessary to sabotage key economic installations.
Subversion tactics, according to Herman (1987) include the use
of "actions taken to discredit and destabilize opposed governments,
including the use of disinformation, economic pressure and harass
ment, manipulating the institutional environment of the victim by
bribery and the discriminatory use of aid, and encouraging and
supporting conspiracies and coups" (p. 12).

Certainly, the mechanism

of subversion, as defined by Herman (1987) includes many subcategor
ies, such as the economic embargo placed on Cuba, the assassination
plots which were designed to inspire a coup, and the dissemination of
disinformation by U.S. officials.
Invasions are defined by the Random House College Dictionary
(1988) as "the act or instance of invading or entering as an enemy,
especially by an army" (p. 701).3

With respect to Cuba, the infa

mous Bay of Pigs Invasion was the most overt and obvious form of
state-sponsored terrorism the U.S. has engaged in.

As I will

demonstrate later, this invasion was likely the result of failed
assassination attempts (supplying repression) and failed attempts to
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subvert the Cuban government.
Rehabilitating fascists, according to Herman (1987) began
shortly after World War II when the U.S. "protected and positioned
for Cold War Services" many Nazi war criminals (p. 11).

Prouty

(1992) also claims that many Nazi intelligence specialists were se
cretly transported from the Ukraine at the end of World War II on
U.S. military planes.

These individuals, by Herman's (1987) account,

were protected from prosecution during the Nuremberg trials, given
fabricated documents, and relocated throughout the world.

In fact,

Herman (1987) cites a former CIA analyst's description of Thailand's
Phibum Sonkram as the "first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after
the war" (p. 11).

Indeed, the rehabilitation of fascists after World

War II was an integral part of a much larger interest of the United
States, namely containing Soviet expansionism during the Cold War.
Clearly, the Cold War, with the conflict between capitalist democracy
and communism has driven much of the terrorist activities of the U.S.
since the end of World War II.

However, there is no clear link be

tween this mechanism and U.S./Cuba relations, therefore this mechan
ism will not be discussed further in this research.
Clearly, the mechanisms of terrorism, as outlined by Herman
(1987), do not always represent neat categories into which all forms
of state-sponsored terrorism fall.

Indeed, these mechanisms, upon

closer scrutiny, become intricately woven and inseparable in the case
of Cuba, as they were often done in concert.

Nevertheless, I will

attempt to designate the activities in question to those mechanisms

36
they most closely resemble while attempting to maintain the inte
grity of Herman's (1987) original work.
As was mentioned earlier, other criminologists, (Barak, 1990,
1991; Kennedy, 1970; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1970; Sellin, 1938;
Tifft & Sullivan, 1980) have noted that there are problems in in
vestigating the actions of those who define criminal law, as the law
often reflects their interests.

Following from this, I have decided

that using a legalistic framework may not be the most appropriate
method to examine the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism.
From this, I have chosen to conceptualize terrorism in a
nondiscriminatory manner using a single standard applicable to the
acts of nation-states against citizens which aims to achieve a poli
tical objective.

Terrorism, therefore, will be examined in terms of

the amount of harm done, as opposed to acts which are ideologically
legitimate from the standpoint of the perpetrator.

Furthermore, the

issue as to whether or not these acts are criminal in nature lies in
the international covenants and treaties previously discussed which
strictly prohibit acts of terrorism.

Finally, Herman's (1987)

mechanisms of wholesale terrorism will provide the theoretical frame
work in which U.S. aggression toward Cuba will be placed.

CHAPTER III
THE MECHANISMS OF STATE TERROR
Introduction to the Chapter
What follows in this chapter is an examination of the rationale
for studying U.S. sponsored terrorism against Cuba, as well as an
examination of specific terrorist acts.

There are five principal

propositions set forth in this chapter.
As was mentioned in Chapter I, there is a historical double
standard employed by the U.S. in defining what constitutes state
sponsored terrorism, and this process of transference will be exam
ined first.

Second, the historical context in which the U.S. govern

ment allowed the CIA to engage in terrorist activities will be exam
ined, with particular emphasis on the perceived threats posed from a
communist Cuba.

Third, the means by which the U.S. government at

tempted to eliminate this threat will be addressed.

In short, the

CIA was the predominant vehicle used to accomplish these goals.
Fourth, the issue of accountability will be addressed as to provide
an understanding of the organizational mechanisms which absolve
individual actors.

However, as mentioned in Chapter I, the focus of

this research is not necessarily the individual actors responsible
for carrying out these crimes, therefore, this issue is only discussed in larger organizational terms.

Finally, Herman's (1987)

mechanisms of state-sponsored terrorism will be documented and
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discussed in their order of increasing involvement, beginning with
thecovert activities of the CIA to supply repression and ending with
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
A Case Study in Transference
The justification for examining the United States and Cuba is
perhaps best given by Chomsky (1992a) when he states that "in re
spected scholarship, U.S. terrorism against Cuba has been excised
from the record in a display of servility that would impress the most
dedicated totalitarian" (p. 149).

Elsewhere, Chomsky 1987) notes

that
a twenty year war has been waged against Cuba. Cuba has
probably been the target of more international terrorism
than any other country, and, therefore, in the American
Ideological system it is regarded as the source of inter
national terrorism, exactly what Orwell would have pre
dicted (p. 328).
Certainly, there has been little scholarly research done in
reference to terrorism committed against Cuba, notwithstanding the
large amounts of work done about terrorist acts committed Ju Cuba
(for one such example see Sterling, 1981).

Herman (1987) succinctly

summarizes the belief that Cuba is not the recipient of terrorism
when he states that "the attacks on Cuba by the United States provide
a remarkable case study in multi-dimensional state terror combined
with the process of 'transference' --that is, accusing Cuba of doing
precisely what the United States is doing to Cuba" (p. 9; emphasis in
original).
Finally, Barak (1990) states that there is much work to be done
regarding the problem of state criminality, as well as re-examining
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its scope.

With reference to state sponsored terrorism, Barak (1990)

notes that some terrorist acts have been selectively examined.

This

selectivity, according to Barak (1990) "refers not only to countries
emphasized and neglected, but to the various forms of terrorism
committed" (p. 14).

In point of fact, Barak's (1990) observation of

the neglect with respect to the various forms of terrorism closely
parallels Herman's (1982) call to more critically examine the mechan
isms of state-sponsored terrorism.
The Cold War: Pretext for Terrorism
Shortly after World War II, the United States and the former
Soviet Union began another war-the "Cold War".

This war was an

ideological one, pitting communism against capitalism and democracy.
According to Prouty (1992), this war was "an alternative, all-new
type of invisible war to be waged under the cloak of propaganda,
black budgets, and secrecy" (p. 7).

Interestingly enough, however,

the invisibility of this war was due to the fact that the battle
fields were often in Semi- Peripheral (i.e., Third World) countries.
Aside from the Korean war, and the conflict in Vietnam, these bat
tlefields have not received much attention.
Arguably, from the standpoint of officials in Washington, the
Cold War was designed to protect U.S. citizens from an invading com
munist ideology.

However, one could also argue that it was designed

to foster and protect U.S. economic interests.

In point of fact, the

goals of protecting friendly investment climates for U.S.
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corporations, as well as U.S. wealth can readily be seen in the form
er head of the U.S. State Department's planning staff George Kennan's
thoughts on the matter in Policy Planning Study of 23 February 1948
when he stated that
we have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of
its population... In this situation, we cannot fail to be
the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the
coming period is to devise a pattern of relationship which
will permit us to maintain this position of disparity with
out positive detriment to our national security. To do so,
we will have to dispense with all senti-mentality and day
dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated
everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need
not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of
altruism and world-benefaction. . . We should cease to talk
about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the
raising of living standards, and democratization. The day
is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight
power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic
slogans, the better (cited in Chomsky, 1985, p. 48).
Kennan's statement clearly illustrates typical concerns that
U.S. officials had during the era when the Cold War started, and
nicely elucidates the conflict between the commitment to human rights
and democracy on the one hand, and the maintenance of the disparity
between the U.S. and the rest of the world on the other hand.

As

Tifft and Markham (1991) note, "commitment to democracy, human
rights, and people's needs is often in conflict with foreign policies
established to promote and secure U.S. based corporate investment and
to guarantee our entitlement to a disproportionate share of the
world's wealth" (p. 129).

The belief in entitlement to a dispro

portionate share of the world's wealth is not something new to the
United States.

Unquestionably, there has been a historical tendency

for the U.S. to claim for itself those things which could be taken
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from others, which is clearly illustrated by the early expansionism
in the U.S., which, according to Takaki (1993), was "celebrated as
manifest destiny" (p. 167).
During the initial years of the Cold War, the U.S. developed
the means by which to contain the communist threat to its manifest
destiny when the CIA was created.

During the early years of the Cold

War, the CIA was responsible for disrupting the governments, economic
systems, and militaries of many countries throughout the Western Hem
isphere, most notably Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1960, the Dominican
Republic in 1961, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1970.

All of these

countries were the victims of covert CIA insurgency, often times un
der the protective auspices of the U.S. government.

With respect to

Cuba, the role of the Cold War is of importance not only for the
ideological differences between the U.S. and Cuba, but also because
Castro's revolution threatened many U.S. economic interests.
The initial concern by the U.S. over the Castro/ Guevara-led
revolution centered around the fear that the revolutionary forces in
Cuba would nationalize U.S. companies in Cuba.

Although the U.S.

attempted diplomatic relations with Cuba to assuage the fears of U.S.
businesses, by March of 1960, according to Meyer and Szulc (1962),
the relationship between the United States and Castro's Cuba had be
come severely strained.

Meyer and Szulc (1962) claim that the explo

sion on board a French munitions ship in the Havana harbor which kil
led seventy Cubans was the turning point in U.S.--Cuban negotiations
in 1960.

Prior to the explosion of the La Coubre, the U.S. had been
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conducting diplomatic negotiations with Castro in an attempt to re
solve tensions created from Castro's desire to nationalize U.S. owned
property in Cuba (Meyer & Szulc, 1962).

Meyer and Szulc (1962) state

that "the original expectation had been that the United States com
panies would lose their land under the provisions of the Agrarian Re
form Law, and that in time the American-owned utilities would be
taken over" (p. 43).
However, after the La Coubre explosion, Castro's revolutionary
forces succeeded in seizing three U.S. owned sugar mills and the Moa
Mining Company in Oriente Province, which was worth, according to
Meyer and Szulc (1962), over $75,000,000.

Soon after this massive

seizure of U.S. owned property, Major Che Guevara declared an "eco
nomic war with the great power of the North" (Meyers & Szulc, 1962,
p. 43).

Major Guevara (cited in Meyers and Szulc, 1962) asserted

that an ideological and economic war would be undertaken by Cuba
against the United States by claiming that
to conquer something, we have to take it away from
somebody, and it is well to speak clearly and not hide
behind concepts that could be misinterpreted. This some
thing that we have to conquer is the sovereignty of the
country; it has to be taken away from that somebody who
is called the monopoly . . . although monopolies in gen
eral have no country, they have at least a common defini
tion: all the monopolies that have been in Cuba, that have
profited from the Cuban land, have very close ties with
the United States. This is to say that our economic war
will be with the great power to the North . . . our road
toward liberation will be founded in the victory over the
monopolies, and concretely over the American monopolies
(pp. 43-44).
Guevara also accused the U.S. of engaging in economic colonial
ism, economic slavery and grossly exploiting the people and resources
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of Cuba, while warning that Cuba was not another Guatemala which
could be easily overtaken (Meyers & Szulc, 1962).

Certainly, Guevara

made no attempt to mask the fact that he and Castro would not allow
the Cuban revolution to be derailed by the United States.
It should be noted here that United States' relations with Cuba
during the initial stages of the revolution were not entirely diplo
matic.

As Meyers and Szulc (1962) note, covert military operations

against Cuba were initiated long before Guevara's threat of economic
war.

These activities, according to Meyers and Szulc (1962) included

harassment flights over Cuba by U.S. military planes in which bombs
were dropped on either crowds of people or utility plants.

There

fore, Guevara and Castro's fears of an outright military retaliation
by the United States were not without merit, particularly since they
had decided to nationalize the U.S. owned companies.

In fact, Meyers

and Szulc (1962) point to the fact that Castro, almost prophetically,
informed the Cuban people that an invasion by the U.S. was forthcom
ing.
Ball (1969) claims that the ultimate breaking point between the
U.S. and Cuba was the result of Khrushchev's threat "to support Cuba
with 'rocket firepower' against any United States aggression" (p.
142).

In fact, the Cuban acceptance of Soviet support against U.S.

aggression would eventually lead to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Nevertheless, the U.S., as will be demonstrated in the following
section, relied heavily upon covert activities against the Cuban
government to implement its foreign policy directives.
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Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation4
According to the United States Senate Select Committee which
studied the alleged CIA assassination plots of foreign leaders, co
vert action is defined as "activity which is meant to further the
sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives, and to be concealed
in order to permit that nation to plausibly deny responsibility"
(p. 9).

Although the National Security Act of 1947 which established
the CIA did not originally give this organization specific authority
to engage in covert actions, the National Security Council (NSC) gave
them this authority in a top secret directive upon their first meet
ing in 1947 (U.S. Senate, 1975).

From 1955 to 1970, the basic auth

ority of the CIA to engage in covert activities resided in NSC di
rective 5412/2 (U.S. Senate, 1975).

The primary intent of these co

vert activities, as defined by NSC directive 5412/2 was to "counter,
reduce, and discredit 'international communism' throughout the world
in a manner consistent with United States' foreign and military pol
icies" (U.S. Senate, p. 9).

The means by which these covert activ

ities were to be implemented included "any covert activities related
to propaganda, economic warfare, political action (including sabo
tage, demolition, and assistance to resistance movements) and all
activities compatible with the directive" (U.S. Senate, p. 9).
In short, the CIA was given carte blanche to wage a war on
communism, as the CIA, was, in fact, held unaccountable for the larg
er consequences of its actions.

Indeed, the CIA engaged in not only
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ethically questionable activities during its formative years, but
also activities which would be defined as illegal in any other con
text; namely conspiracy to assassinate a foreign head of state. 5
Beyond Incrimination (Plausable Denial)
As Kennedy (1970) notes, there has been a historical tendency
for certain groups to define their own behavior as being beyond in
crimination.

Behaviors by the powerful, with consequences often far

more severe than that of those who are considered dangerous, are not
defined as criminal in nature.

Often times, these individuals also

have the luxury of the doctrine of plausible denial. It is clear that
the CIA has (and to a large extent still does) existed in an area
which is beyond incrimination, protected by plausible denial.
Plausible denial refers to the notion that the actions of ei
ther individuals or groups can not be attributed to them, even if
they have prior knowledge of such actions.

With reference to the

concept of plausible denial, the U.S. Senate committee (1975) con
cluded that "evidence before the committee clearly demonstrates that
this concept, designed to protect the United States and its opera
tives from the consequences of disclosures, has been expanded to mask
decisions of the President and his senior staff members" (p. 11).
Although the individuals responsible for the assassination
plots were not held accountable under the doctrine of plausible de
nial, their knowledge of such plots, even if disclosed, would not
have implicated them of having engaged in any illegal activity.
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Prior to the 1975 Senate hearings on the alleged assassination plots
of foreign leaders, there were no U.S. laws making it illegal to
assassinate a foreign head of state outside the boundaries of the
United States.

Actually, according to this committee (U.S. Senate,

1975), the existing statute on this issue
made it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign
official or foreign official guest while such a person is
in the United States. However, there is no law which makes
it a crime to assassinate, to conspire to assassinate, or
to attempt to assassinate a foreign official while such of
ficial is outside the United States (p. 283).
Unquestionably, the extant law on the matter of conspiracy to
assassinate, or the actual assassination of a foreign head of state,
was very narrowly interpreted by the U.S. Senate as not to include
those crimes of which the CIA had been accused.

Subsequently, the

U.S. Senate (1975) decided to recommend that conspiracies, attempts
and actual assassinations by U.S. officials be declared illegal,
irrespective of the geographic location of said official.

However,

both the doctrine of plausible denial and a narrowly interpreted law
functioned to absolve the CIA from its alleged involvement in the
assassination attempts of several heads of foreign states.
Although the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro represent a clear incidence in which a crime was committed, the totality
of the CIA-sponsored terrorist activities are much larger in scope.
In the following section, I will apply Herman's (1987) mechanisms of
terrorism to these CIA-sponsored acts.
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Supplying Repression
As was mentioned earlier, Herman (1987) defines supplying
repression as "the buildup, financing, arming, and training of Third
World police, intelligence, and military personnel" (p. 13).

With

respect to U.S. involvement in supplying repression, these activi
ties include those of Operation Mongoose, and the Cuban Coordinating
Committee which were conducted in the early 1960s.
In November of 1962 the proposal for a major new covert offen
sive against Castro's Cuba was developed by former President Ken
nedy's assistants, Richard Goodwin and General Edward Lansdale.
Goodwin and Lansdale were both experienced in counter-insurgency tac
tics developed by the CIA.

The primary intent of Operation Mongoose,

as developed by Goodwin and Lansdale, was to "use our available ***
[sic] assets to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime" (U.S. Se
nate, 1975, p. 139).

In the following sections I will examine some

of these counter-insurgency tactics designed to help the citizenry of
Cuba overthrow Castro.
There were eventually 33 tasks designed for implementation
under Operation Mongoose, which included a variety of activities
ranging from intelligence collection to planning for "use of U.S.
military force to support the Cuban popular movement", as well as
the development of an "operational schedule for sabotage actions in
side Cuba" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 142).

The final task, Task 33,

involved a plot to "incapacitate Cuban sugar workers during the har
vest by the use of chemical warfare means" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p.
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143).
It is unclear as to the extent to which these plots were car
ried out, as much of the information concerning the specificities of
Operation Mongoose are still classified.

However, evidence has sur-

faced that some of these plans did come to fruition.

As Chomsky and

Herman (1979) note, reports of subversive activities have been con
firmed by others.

Chomsky and Herman (1979) note that "according to

a recent statement of a Canadian advisor to the Cuban government, as
early as 1962 he was paid $5,000 by a Defense Intelligence Agency
representative to infect Cuban poultry with a viral disease" (p. 25).
Chomsky (1982) also adds that
apart from the attempts to assassinate Castro, which are
well known, these terrorist actions included attacks on
fishing boats and Cuban civilian installations, and poi
soning of crops and livestock-projects that were, in fact,
very effective, apparently requiring the destruction of
half a million pigs after an outbreak of African swine
fever caused by U.S. based terrorists in what the U.N.
Food and Agricultural Organization call the 'most alarm
ing event of 1971' (p. 49).
In addition, Chomsky (1987) notes that
in 1987 it was revealed that one of the many terrorist
operations mounted against Cuba took place at a parti
cularly tense moment of the Cuban missile crisis; a
CIA-dispatched terrorist team blew up a Cuban industrial
facility with a reported death toll of 400 workers, an
incident that might have set off a nuclear war (p. 113).
These accounts of sabotage are not that different from what was
called for in the original plans of Operation Mongoose.

Acts which

were considered called for a major sabotage operation at a Cuban cop
per mine, as well as "blowing up bridges, to stop communications, and
blowing up certain production plants" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 146).
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Indeed, the tasks called for in Operation Mongoose were not only
violent, but also innovative.

One such innovative plan called for

the dropping of leaflets within Cuba to encourage the citizenry to
consider bounties on Communist leaders such as Castro.

These dead or

alive bounties ranged from $5,000 for an informer to $100,000 for
government officials.
was 2 cents.

As for the price on Castro's head, the bounty

This figure was designed "to denigrate Castro in the

eyes of the Cuban population" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 144).

Lansdale,

however, claimed he shelved this plan personally, as he thought it
was not something that could be seriously undertaken.
Shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis in 1963, Operation Mon
goose was disbanded, and an interagency "Cuban Coordinating Commit
tee" was established within the State Department (U.S. Senate, 1975).
The disbandment of Operation Mongoose, however, did not include a
total cessation of sabotage plans, as the Cuban Coordinating Commit
tee soon began to evaluate possible courses of covert action which
could be taken against Castro and Cuba.
According to the Senate Report (1975), the sabotage plans of
the Cuban Coordinating Committee contrasted Operation Mongoose in the
sense that the new efforts were designed to "nourish a spirit of re
sistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections
and other byproducts of unrest" (p. 173).

Eventually, 13 major sabo

tage operations were approved in 1963, including plans to sabotage
economic installations such as an electric plant, an oil refinery
and a sugar mill (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 173).
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According to Herman (1982), the activities of the CIA-sponsored
Cubans continued into the 1970s.

The Cuban refugee terrorist network

(CRN), which consists of an elite group of 100 to 200 hard-core ex
iles, was left to incorporate violence as a political strategy under
the protective auspices of the U.S. government (Herman, 1982).

This

group is believed to be responsible for more than 28 bombings of Cu
ban Embassies and Missions, killing 6 people from 1973 to 1979 (Her
man, 1982).

Herman (1982) also notes that during this same period 14

economic facilities were sabotaged, as well as a commercial airliner,
resulting in the deaths of 73 passengers, among which were the mem
bers of Cuba's gold medal fencing team. Finally, 8 individuals died
between 1973 and 1979 as the direct result of individual bombings
(Herman, 1982).

The net loss of lives during this time period was

94.
The interesting thing about the CRN is that they were trained
by the CIA in the 1960s in the arts of demolition and assassination.
Herman (1982) claims that this CIA prodigy has never been disarmed,
and has existed for nearly 30 years.

The longevity of this group, as

Herman (1982) notes, may very well have to do with the fact that
"they are apparently killing the right people for the right people
(DINA, the CIA perhaps), in which case the law ceases to function"
(p. 69).
Indeed, the case of Orlando Bosch, who was a member of the CRN,
well illustrates the reluctance of the U.S. to admonish those terror
ists they sponsor.

According to Herman (1982), Bosch was paroled by
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the U.S. in 1972 after serving two years of a ten year sentence for a
bombing attack, and subsequently left the U.S. in violation of his
conditions of parole.

Bosch then traveled to Venezuela, Chile,

Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic before being ar
rested in 1974 for two more bombings in Caracas, Venezuela (Herman,
1982).

Herman (1982) states that the Venezuelan government twice

offered to extradite Bosch to U.S. officials for rearrest and in
carceration, however, the U.S. government declined both times.

Sub

sequently, according to Herman (1982), Bosch admitted to Venezuelan
officials that he had participated in the bombing of the Cuban air
liner in which 73 lives were lost.

However, Herman (1982) claims

that the then newly elected pro-Reagan Social Christian movement of
Venezuela "shifted his trial to a military tribunal, which found him
innocent of anything but faulty identification papers" (pp. 68-69).
In 1985 yet another case of the U.S. supplying repression
against Cuba surfaced, as Cuban officials alleged that the U.S. had
deliberately introduced the Dengue virus which causes a potentially
fatal disease called Dengue hemorrhagic fever.

In fact, the U.S.

Department of State (1985) acknowledges that within three months
344,203 cases of Dengue fever were reported in Cuba, resulting in
116,146 hospitalizations and 159 deaths.

Although the U.S. Depart

ment of State (1985) officially denied these allegations, there is
evidence to suggest that the Dengue outbreak in 1981 may have been
introduced by Cuban exiles working for the United States.
The crux of the Cuban claim that the virus had been

52
deliberately introduced to Cuba relied upon the testimony given by
convicted terrorist Eduardo Arocena.

Eduardo Arocena's (U.S. Depart

ment of State, 1985) testimony states that
the mission of the group I headed was to take certain germs
and to introduce them into Cuba so that they could be used
against the Soviets and against the Cuban economy in order
to begin what was called the chemical. (sic] warfare. The
results of this were not as expected. We had thought that
they were to be used against the Soviet forces but they were
used against our people and we did not agree with that (p.
3).
The U.S. Department of State (1985) maintained that the Dengue
virus had not been introduced to Cuba, but was a result of insufficient mosquito control on the part of the Cuban government.

Further

more, the U.S. Department of State (1985) told the Cuban government
that their accusations were baseless and should be retracted at once.
Cuba, however, claimed that the Dengue virus was only one of many
biological attacks on the nation of Cuba, and was not at all incon
sistent with other attacks and plots against either Castro or the
nation-state of Cuba.

The Cuban government (cited in U.S. Department

of State, 1985) claimed that within a period of
three years, five serious diseases and epidemics have struck
Cuban livestock, crops and people. These are swine fever,
blue mold (tobacco), red rot (sugar cane), hemorrhagic den
gue and conjunctivitis. These calamities have caused con
siderable material and human damage (p. 3).
Clearly, both the U.S. and Cuba differ in their analysis of the
Dengue outbreak.

However, in so much as the U.S. Department of State

(1981) denied U.S. responsibility for the Dengue fever epidemic, it
did not address whether or not any other forms of biological warfare
had been directed towards Cuba.
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In summary, then, the U.S. has been accused of, and has ad
mitted conspiring to, supply repression against Cuba.

Undoubtedly,

the effects of those actions which were carried out have had a nega
tive impact on not only the economy of Cuba, but on its citizenry as
well.

More importantly, however, these acts have caused indiscrim

inate harm to persons, and certainly would be considered terrorist in
nature had they occurred in most any other context.
Subversion
Subversion tactics, according to Herman (1987) include "actions
taken to discredit and destabilize opposed governments, including the
use of disinformation, economic pressure and harassment, manipulating
the institutional environment of the victim by bribery and the
discriminatory use of aid, and encouraging and supporting conspir
acies and coups" (p. 12).

I will focus on economic pressure, assas

sination attempts (which also includes the support for coups) and
disinformation, respectively, in the following sections.

I have

opted to condense Herman's (1987) subcategories of subversion with
the hopes of maintaining the original integrity of his conceptual
model, while at the same time making it easily applicable to the case
of Cuba.

For instance, the support of conspiracies and coups cited

by Herman (1987) is, as I will demonstrate later, inextricably tied
to assassination attempts.

Similarly, economic pressure is broadly

defined by Herman (1987) to include everything from the indiscrim
inate use of aid to economic embargoes.

It is in this light, then,
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that I will categorize the subcategories of subversion in Herman's
(1987) framework.
The reason I have chosen to examine these subcategories of
subversion in this order is because of their temporal sequence.

For

example, the economic embargo has been in effect since 1960, and it
was shortly thereafter that the assassination plots were hatched.
Finally, during the 1980s the U.S. attacks on Cuba's human rights
violations peaked in concert with a campaign of disinformation.
Economic Pressure
Ball (1969) claims that the context in which the economic em
bargo was placed upon Cuba by the U.S. and its allies was marked by
anticommunist sentiment.

According to Ball (1969), the embargo was

placed on Cuba in 1960, under the authority of the Trading With the
Enemy Act, by the Johnson and Kennedy administrations in order to
"increase internal unrest in Cuba, diminish Cuba's capacity for
subversion in the hemisphere, reduce Cuba's showcase appeal to Latin
America, and to burden the Communist nations so that they will be
persuaded that they are backing a losing and expensive horse"
(p. 130).

The immediate effects of the embargo, however, did not

accomplish most of the aforementioned goals.
Shortly after the U.S. imposed the economic embargo on Cuba,
the Cuban government turned to the socialist-bloc Community for Mu
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

According to Kuntz (1994), approx

imately 85% of all Cuban trade from the early 1960s to 1990 was
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conducted through the CMEA.

The remaining 15%, according to Kuntz

(1994), was conducted with trading partners in the West, including
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.

During this time Cuba made

significant gains in education, medicine and poverty reduction.

With

respect to education, for example, Kuntz (1994) states that by 1990
Cuba had achieved a literacy rate of nearly 100%.

Cuba has also

achieved, according to Kuntz (1994), "comprehensive, accessible
health care to the entire population without charge" (p. 163), an
accomplishment not yet achieved by the United States.

Kuntz (1994)

cites that Cuba's infant mortality rate as well as their under 5
years old infant mortality rate6
1960.

have decreased dramatically since

In fact, Kuntz (1994) points out that Cuba's 1991 rates for

both these indicators place them well ahead of all other Latin Amer
ican countries, as well as all other developing countries world wide.
In comparison to the United States (which ranks 22nd in the world for
both indicators), Kuntz (1994) claims that Cuba ranks 26th for both
indicators, a feat accomplished with less than one-twentieth of the
Gross National Product (GNP) of the United States.
invested a great deal of its resources in health.

Indeed, Cuba has
Currently, Kuntz

(1994) states that Cuba's "advanced research facilities, including
biotechnology and genetic engineering centers, are among the most
sophisticated in the world" (p. 163).
However, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
communist block in 1990, Cuba was forced to look elsewhere for trad
ing partners.

With respect to Cuba's medical products, for example,
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Kuntz (1994) states that until 1990 60% of Cuba's imported medical
products came from CMEA, and 40% from Western trading partners.
After 1990, Cuba was forced to import nearly 70% of its medical pro
ducts from the West, which, according to Kuntz (1994), were far less
in volume than previous years as the result of Cuba's hard currency
shortages.
If anything, the long term impact of the economic embargo on
Cuba has caused recent hard currency shortages. As for the afore
mentioned goals of the Johnson administration, however, Castro's
commitment to communism remains.

Whether or not the embargo has been

successful in terms of other U.S. goals is perhaps best stated by one
of the major proponents of the embargo, Michael Kozak (cited in U.S.
Senate, 1990).

Kozak (cited in U.S. Senate, 1990) states that

some say that our embargo policy has failed given the
survival of Fidel Castro's communist regime. Such cri
ticism misses the point. Given Castro's ideological
commitment to his vision of revolution, it is unlikely
that economic sanctions alone will ever induce him to ab
andon his goals. What the embargo does is to deny Cuba
opportunities to earn hard currency and acquire goods,
thus limiting the resources available to the government
to carry out policies inimical to U.S. interests. To put
it in starker terms, every dollar that the embargo pre
vents Cuba from earning from an American tourist is a dol
lar that Cuba cannot spend to provide a rifle to overthrow
a democratically elected government in our hemisphere.
(pp. 103-104)
Whether or not the embargo has prevented the Cuban government
from overthrowing democratically elected governments in "our" hemisphere, is certainly debatable.

However, the embargo has created,

according to Richard Newcomb (cited in U.S. Senate, 1990), "obvious
hard currency shortages and other costs on the Cuban economy"
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(p. 113).

Naturally, these effects have been felt by the populace of

Cuba, and although it is difficult to assess the full impact of the
economic embargo over the past 34 years, its current impact is quite
substantial.
According to Cesar Chelala (1993) "for more than a year and a
half each Cuban has had access to only one pound of rice, six pounds
of beans, two eggs, a pint of oil, and less than 15 kilograms of
potatoes per month" (p. 19).

Chelala (1993) cites the economic col

lapse of the former Soviet Union as the other contributing factor for
Cuba's shortages.

This embargo, according to Tessirtore and Woolfson

(1993), was recently declared

by the United Nations' General Assemb

ly as "violating such Charter principles as sovereign equality and
non-intervention and noninterference in internal affairs as well as
the commercial freedoms enshrined in many international legal in
struments" (p. 291).
Certainly, the harmful effects of economic embargoes on the
general population of a nation-state have received much attention
recently with the case of Haiti.

Chomsky (1992b) claims that former

President Bush was hesitant to place an economic embargo on the na
tion of Haiti, as he thought its effects on the general populace
would be too severe.

Despite former President Bush's recognition of

the indiscriminate and detrimental effects of economic embargoes,
Chomsky (1992b) notes that the 34 year embargo placed on Cuba by the
U.S. was not addressed by former President Bush.
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Assassination Attempts of Castro
Although Ball (1969) states that the intent of the economic
embargo was to destabilize the Cuban government, during the 1960s the
CIA was taking more overt measures to remove Fidel Castro from power
and sponsor coups.
In August of 1975, Fidel Castro met with Senator George Mc
Govern, at which time McGovern was given a list of twenty-four al
leged CIA assassination attempts on Castro (U.S. Senate, 1975).
These alleged assassination attempts were then investigated by a U.S.
Senate Committee, which concluded that there had been eight plots to
assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965, although the CIA denied
any direct involvement (Hamm, 1993).

Although the details of seven

plots were disclosed in the Senate Hearings, the eighth plot remains
classified (U.S. Senate, 1975).
While the plots to assassinate Castro are certainly deserving
of much attention, for the sake of this research, I will only briefly
discuss the major tactics used.

The first plot to assassinate Cas

tro, occurring in 1960, involved a conspiracy with the Mafia to kill
him with the use of poisoned capsules. These capsules were given to a
Cuban "asset" in Cuba who worked at a restaurant which Castro regu
larly frequented.

In 1961, a second attempt was carried out, this

time with the help of the Cuban attorney, Humberto Sori.

This plot

involved the use of plastic explosives; however, the plot was uncov
ered before it could be implemented, and Humberto Sori was put to
death at the order of Castro.

The third attempt, in 1962, resorted
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to the poison capsules again, which met the same fate as the first
poisoned capsule attempt (U.S. Senate, 1975).
Not being easily deterred, two more plots were hatched by the
CIA in 1963.

The first of these plots included the use of an explo

sive seashell, which was to be placed underwater in an area where
Fidel Castro frequently went skin diving.

The second plot of 1963

was also related to Castro's passion for skin diving, and consisted
of a plan to send Castro a "gift" of a skin diving suit laced with a
fungus which causes a disease called Mandura Foot, and a breathing
apparatus contaminated with tubercle bacillus, which is a tuberculo
Neither of these plots were carried out,

sis germ (Hamm, 1993).

however, because as former director of the CIA Richard Helms stated,
these plans "seemed to be cock-eyed" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 86).

In

truth, Hamm (1993) notes that those who have studied Fidel Castro's
life know that he does not use such devices.
In the sixth plot to assassinate Castro, the CIA employed the
services of Rolando Cubela Secades, a high ranking Cuban government
official who was, at the time, considering defecting to the United
States (Hamm, 1993).

Cubela was given an arms cache by the CIA which

included hand grenades, and a high powered rifle with telescopic
sights.

Cubela quickly realized that an all-out ambush-style assas

sination would cost him his own life, therefore, he decided to ask
the CIA if they could provide him with a more sophisticated means of
accomplishing his task.

The CIA then provided Cubela a pen which

contained a very fine hypodermic needle.

Cubela was told that he
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should lace the needle with "Blackleaf-40", a deadly poison which can
be bought over the counter.

The plan called for Cubela to "accident

ly" prick Castro with the pen, which would cause instant death.

This

plan was abandoned, however, with the death of former President Ken
nedy in November of 1963.

Cubela, however, would conspire with the

CIA once again in 1964 for a seventh attempt.
The seventh attempt to assassinate Castro was to be the "first
step" in Cubela's coup d'etat.

Apparently, Cubela wanted to over

throw the Castro regime and, in response, the CIA put him in contact
with a Cuban exile in Miami by the name of Artime.

According to Hin

kle and Turner (1981), Artime was a former Bay of Pigs invader.

Art

ime assured Cubela that if he could assassinate Castro, Artime and
his Cuban exiles would help him escape Cuba, and within 48 hours of
the assassination a force of 750 Cuban exiles would be conveyed to
the shores of Cuba to "raise the morale and spirits of the Cuban peo
ple" (Hamm, 1993, p. 332).

This plan, furthermore, was largely

financed by the CIA and the Mafia (Hinkle & Turner, 1981).
It is unclear as to why the CIA decided to sever their ties
with both Cubela and Artime in 1965 (the official reason given was
that of "security interests").

What is known, however, is that Cas

tro somehow uncovered Cubela's planned coup d'etat, and in 1965 Cube
la was arrested and charged with plotting to kill the Cuban head of
state (Szulc, 1986).
It is evident that the CIA intended to remove Castro from power
and to replace him with a more amenable figure.

Certainly, the
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assassination attempts were designed to work in conjunction with
coups.

In terms of Herman's (1987) mechanisms of state terrorism,

the assassination conspiracies and plots for coups are clearly attempts to subvert the Cuban government.

Although the assassination

conspiracies by the CIA represent one of the most visible mechanisms
of state-sponsored terror, it is evident that other mechanisms were
used concurrently, such as the sabotage plans and the economic em
bargo. It is perhaps because of the continued failure of these in
dependent mechanisms of state-sponsored terror that others were in
corporated to remove Castro from power.
Disseminating Disinformation
The campaign to disseminate disinformation about Cuba has been
studied by relatively few people in the profession of criminology.
Others, however, have examined this issue with some depth (e.g., see
Biancalana & O'Leary 1988; Mccaughan & Platt 1988).

Mccaughan and

Platt's (1988) study of U.S. press coverage of Cuba during 1986 re
vealed that it was decidedly one sided.

It is important to note that

during this same time, the United States claimed to be waging a war
on terrorism, with former President Ronald Reagan at the helm.

Al

though the press had been accused of being sympathetic towards Cuba
during the 1980s, Mccaughan and Platt (1988) provide evidence to the
contrary.

For instance, Mccaughan and Platt (1988) state that 14.5%

of the 331 newspaper and periodical articles analyzed in their re
search of U.S. press coverage of Cuba in 1986 documented the
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"failures, problems, setbacks, disasters, and poor results of Cuba's
socialism" (p. 72).

'While 14.5% of the articles in the Mccaughan and

Platt (1988) study reported problems Cuba was experiencing, 10% of
the articles failed to report the positive achievements of Cuba, most
notably their advances in health care, education, and economic con
struction.

Citing that "most positive news about Cuba is ignored,

reinterpreted, or mystified" (p. 75), Mccaughan and Platt (1988)
claim that the articles which failed to report Cuba's positive
achievements were often dispassionate.
'While Mccaughan and Platt (1988) found that Cuba's achievements
were down-played and its problems given considerable attention, the
emphasis that Cuba was a Soviet "beachhead in our backyard" remained
(p. 77).

Twenty of the 331 articles analyzed by Mccaughan and Platt

(1988) carried this theme.

However, little attention was given in

these articles, as Mccaughan and Platt (1988) note, to the fact that
relations between the former Soviet Union and Cuba were strained dur
ing this time, nor was the fact considered that the U.S. had effect
ively isolated Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

Consistent with the

theme of Cuba being a Soviet beachhead in our backyard, the image of
Cuba as an exporter of revolution was also found in several of the
articles about Cuba during 1986 (Mccaughan & Platt, 1988).
Although the articles pertaining to Cuba's relationship with
the former Soviet Union, as well as those painting Cuba as an ex
porter of communist revolution were abundant in the Mccaughan and
Platt (1988) study, many more (189 of 331; 57%) painted Cuba as a
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prison run by a tyrannical Castro.

As Mccaughan and Platt (1988)

note, much of this attention was the result of U.S. attacks of al
leged human rights violations during this time.
As Mccaughan and Platt (1988) note, much of this coverage was
greatly influenced by State Department releases during this time.

In

so much as the CIA was not solely responsible for creating an ideo
logical environment which made their activities acceptable, other
government figures played a crucial role in the development of an
ideology conducive to such one-sided reporting, particularly the U.S.
Department of State and George Shultz.

It is important to note that

during this time, the United States was also attempting to use the
United Nations as a vehicle to sanction Cuba for its alleged human
rights violations.

Indeed, releases from the Department of State

severely criticized Cuba for its alleged human rights violations.
One such United States Department of State (1987) report notes that
the "repression of basic human rights today is so pervasive that Cuba
holds the dubious distinction of being the Western hemisphere's most
serious violator of human rights and fundamental freedoms" (p. 459).
However, Cuba's human rights violations, presumably the worst in the
Western Hemisphere, were not compared to the U.S. supported atro
cities occurring in Nicaragua or El Salvador at that time.

Indeed,

Chomsky (1992b) estimates that as many as 100,000 Nicaraguans were
killed by their own government during the 1980s.
However, the United States' official stance on human rights
violations is, as Mccaughan and Platt (1988) note, a very narrowly
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defined, legalistic definition.

Indeed, as Barak (1991) points out,

the United States had not, at that time, ratified treaties and cove
nants which recognized economic and social rights as defined in the
United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor the fol
lowing treaties: the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(1961), the International convention on the Elimination of All forms
of Racial Discrimination (1965), the American Convention on Human
Rights (1965), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights

(1966), the International Convention on the

Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), and
finally, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (1979).
Although the United States had not even ratified the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1986, the attacks on Cuba peaked when
the U.S. mobilized all its efforts to bring accusations
against Cuba before the United Nations . . . Unable to
generate support for a condemnation of Cuba, the U.S.
withdrew its resolution in 1986 and prepared for a new
campaign at the annual session of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in Geneva, in February and March, 1987 (Platt,
1988, pp. 41-42).
Finally, one only need look at the human rights concerns of the
United States in examining the plight of the 6,800 Cuban Merielitos
living in substandard conditions in U.S. prisons during the 1980s.
These people came to the United States in 1980 during the Mariel
boat-lift and were imprisoned after the United States failed to de
port these supposedly unsavory characters back to Cuba.

Subsequent

ly, they were confined in substandard conditions which included 23
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hour per day lock downs, in cells holding up to eight prisoners
(Mccaughan & Platt, 1988).
It is in Cuba's alleged gross violations of human rights where
most of the U.S. attention was focussed in the 1980s, and Cuba's
achievements were not recognized.

Tom Farer of the Rutgers Law

School (cited in Chomsky, 1987), who was a member of the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS and former State
Department assistant for inter-American affairs made the following
statement concerning Cuba's advancements:
there is a consensus among scholars of a wide variety of
ideological positions that, on the level of life expect
ancy, education, and health, Cuban achievement is consi
derably greater than one would expect from its level of
per capita income. A recent study of 113 Third World
countries in terms of these basic indicators of popular
welfare ranked Cuba first, ahead even of Taiwan-which
is probably the outstanding example of growth with equity
within a capitalist economic framework . . . Cuba excelled
according to all main indicators of human needs satisfac
tion . . . What has changed remarkably is not so much the
gross indicators as those that reflect the changed condi
tions of the poor, particularly the rural poor. In 1958,
for example, the one rural hospital in the entire country
represented about 2 percent of the hospital facilities in
Cuba; by 1982 there were 117 (rural) hospitals, or about
35 percent of all hospitals in Cuba (pp. 360-361).
Farer's (cited in Chomsky, 1987) statement provides a clear
example of Mccaughan and Platt's (1988) findings, particularly those
things which are ignored.

However, while the fact that Cuba has

greatly advanced its health care system since 1958 was ignored,
Cuba's alleged involvement in creating instability were given much
press by the U.S. media, fueled by U.S. State Department releases
during the 1980s.

For example, the U.S. Department of State released
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a 12 page report in 1981 claiming that Cuba had renewed its support
for violence in Latin America.

'While acknowledging that Cuba was not

the sole source of instability in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S.
Department of State (1981) claimed that the Cuban government was
responsible for destabalizing its neighbors through "armed opposi
tion movements" (p. 1).

In 1982, another U.S. Department of State

release depicted the Cuban military as an extension of the Soviet
Union, which posed considerable "military threats to the U.S. secur
ity interests in the hemisphere" (p. 5).

Certainly, these two exam

ples of the threat of Cuba as an exporter of communism, as well as a
threat to U.S. national security, are things which have historically
been given much attention in the U.S. press.
The Bay of Pigs Invasion
Perhaps the most visible action taken by the CIA against Cuba
was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961.

The Bay of

Pigs Operation, which later became the Bay of Pigs invasion, was
originally approved by former President Eisenhower (Prouty, 1992).
Eisenhower's Bay of Pigs Operation, as remembered by Prouty, (1992)
originated as a "program of covert action against the Castro regime"
(p. 121).

This covert action, furthermore, was to be carried out by

300 Cuban exiles trained by the CIA at Fort Gulick, Panama (Prouty,
1992).
As Prouty (1992) notes, the context in which the initial ap
proval for covert activities against Cuba was given is of great
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importance.

Although former President Eisenhower had approved the

CIA's training of Cuban exiles for covert paramilitary operations
against Cuba, the CIA did not have Presidential approval for any
plans to use these forces to invade Cuba.

Initially, according to

Prouty (1992), the CIA saw Cuban exiles as persons who could be
trained by the U.S. to overthrow the Cuban government.

Indeed, the

recruitment of Cuban exiles as a paramilitary force can be readily
seen in former CIA director Allen Dulles' March 17, 1960 presentation
to the National Security Council.

Dulles (cited in Prouty, 1992)

stated that preparations
have already been made for the development of an adequate
paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechan
isms for the necessary support of covert military opera
tions on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be
recruited after careful screening and trained as paramili
tary instructors. In a second phase a number ofparamili
tary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of
the United States so as to be available for immediate de
ployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance
forces recruited there both before and after the establish
ment of one or more active centers of resistance. (p. 123)
It was during Eisenhower's presidency when, according to Prouty
(1992), the CIA, at the directorship of Allen Dulles, began to increase the scope of its paramilitary operations without Presidential
approval.

Operation Trinidad, according to Prouty (1992), was imple

mented by the CIA to train the paramilitary Cuban exiles in conven
tional, amphibious, and airborne combat tactics.

Prouty (1992)

claims that former CIA director Richard Bissell, as well as other
high ranking CIA members, felt that if Richard Nixon were elected
president they would have support to move forward with their plans of
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an outright invasion.

If, however, John F. Kennedy were elected,

agency leaders of the CIA, Prouty (1992) states, felt confident that
"they could work with, or around, Kennedy, and they contrived to lock
him into as many programs as possible" (p. 129).
did train the Cuban exiles who

Eventually, the CIA

became known as Brigade 2506.

According to Johnson (1964), Brigade 2506 was supported and
trained by the CIA in Guatemala and consisted of nearly 1,500 men who
were not, according to Montaner (1981), "a revolutionary organization
with a determined political projection, but an army arbitrarily re
cruited by the CIA for a strictly military battle" (p. 199).

Indeed,

the leadership of the CIA, as well as former Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy knew that NSC directive 5412 strictly prohibited the use
of any U.S. military personnel in military operations except in a
time of war (Prouty, 1992).

Therefore, the only personnel who were

to carry out the Bay of Pigs invasion were the CIA-trained Cuban ex
iles.

However, as Johnson (1964) notes, it was later revealed that

the CIA had intended for the first men to land at Playa Giron and
Playa Larga to be Americans.

Although the plan to use U.S. military

personnel in this manner was in direct violation of U.S. law, Johnson
(1964) states that the CIA during this time was "acting at times
contrary to established United States policies, and even contrary to
the wishes of the President of the United States" (p. 227; emphasis
in original).
The Bay of Pigs invasion, which was termed Operation Zapata by
the CIA, was named as such because the CIA intended to capture the
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airfields near Zapata beach.

Prouty (1992) states that U.S. military

personnel believed the airfields at Zapata to be suitable for U.S.
donated B-26 aircraft, which would be used to give Brigade 2506 ade
quate air support from Castro's troops once the invasion began.

In

deed, the role of the B-26 bomber was of crucial import to the CIA's
invasion plans, as they were used to destroy seven of the ten Cuban
T-33 jets which comprised Castro's airforce prior to the actual inva
sion (Prouty, 1992).
On April 17, 1961 former President Kennedy gave the final ap
proval for the Bay of Pigs invasion (Prouty, 1992).

The invading

troops of Brigade 2506, according to Prouty (1992), would occupy Cu
ban soil for at least seventy-two hours at which time the "Cuban
government-in-exile would call upon the OAS for support of the bri
gade immediately and that the United States, with nominal OAS
assistance, would sustain the brigade and its new government"
(p. 130).

It was felt, furthermore, that in

the show of OAS support

and strength, tens of thousands of Cubans would join the brigade and
revolt against Castro's Cuba (Prouty, 1992).

Although Former Presi

dent Kennedy's approval called for the destruction of the Cuban
airforce's remaining three T-33 jets prior to the invasion, Prouty
(1992) states that Kennedy's aide, McGeorge Bundy, delayed the final
air-strike which was to be conducted early in the morning on the day
of the invasion.

The three T-33 jets which were not destroyed later

shot down sixteen of the Brigade's B-26 aircraft, sank their off
shore supply ships, and laid down heavy gunfire on Zapata beach
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(Prouty, 1992).

Ultimately, Prouty (1992) notes that Operation Zapa

ta failed primarily because of the Cuban T-33 jets which were not
destroyed prior to the invasion.
In terms of Herman's (1987) mechanisms of state terrorism, it
is clear that the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion was an attempt by the
U.S. to overthrow the Cuban government.

Although U.S. military

personnel were not used during the invasion itself, as that would
have violated NSC directive 5412, it is clear that U.S. military
equipment was given to the Cuban exiles who were trained by the CIA.
Clearly, Brigade 2506 was acting as an extension of the U.S. mili
tary.
Certainly, the question as to whether or not U.S. military
resources should be used in this manner is a legitimate one.

If U.S.

training and equipment are used to support activities that the U.S.
itself could not legally engage in, one can certainly wonder where
the distinction between what is legal and illegal begins and ends.
For example, in a state defined criminal act, such as a bank robbery,
those persons responsible for arming, training and financing someone
to carry out the robbery for them would be held accountable under
criminal law, at least in terms of conspiracy to commit a crime.
With regards to the CIA-sponsored, and U.S.-endorsed Bay of Pigs
Invasion, the U.S., by proxy, engaged in an unwarranted act of war.
Herman (1987) states that proxy invasions, such as the Bay of
Pigs Invasion, are closely tied to other mechanisms of state terror
ism such as supplying repression.

Herman (1987) states that
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supplying repression, in short, involves the financing, arming, and
training of third world forces with the intent of making them an
extension of the U.S. military.

Although the Bay of Pigs Invasion

could be considered supplying repression by Herman's (1987) defini
tion, the distinction between invasions and repression lies in the
fact that repression comes from within the country, and invasions
generally come from the outside.
In summary, then, the U.S. has clearly engaged in three of the
four conceptual mechanisms of state-sponsored terrorism provided by
Herman (1987).

The primary objective of the U.S. have been to remove

Castro from power and replace him with a more amenable figure.
Furthermore, in the attempt to remove Castro from power the U.S. has
embarked on a set of policy directives

which have been both indis

criminate, as well as harmful to the people of Cuba.

These activi

ties have ranged from the absurd (i.e., the bounties on Castro) to
the illegal, such as the sponsoring of an invasion by proxy.

Taken

in their entirety, however, these activities represent a clear case
of state-sponsored terrorism.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
I mentioned in Chapter I that the approach to this research
would involve an analysis of the sociopolitical and economic context
in which the U.S. has engaged in the crime of state-sponsored terror
ism against Cuba.

Having documented the groundwork for this discus

sion in Chapter III, I will now turn to a brief discussion of these
findings and their implications.
Historically, the U.S. has attempted to maintain a dispropor
tionate share of the world's wealth.

In this endeavor, however, U.S.

foreign (and domestic) policy has encountered difficulties relieving
the tension created by the commitment to democracy and human rights
and foreign policies designed to promote and secure U.S. wealth.
Indeed, I would argue that commitment to democracy and human rights
lags far behind the United States' more immediate concerns of capital
accumulation.

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the non

discriminatory and anachronistic embargo which has been placed on
Cuba, while at the same time the U.S. denounced the Cuban government
for its alleged human rights abuses.
In the U.S. the void between the commitment to human rights and
democracy on one hand, and capital accumulation on the other, is
probably best illustrated by the contrast between the concentration
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of wealth in the hands of a privileged few, and the four million
homeless Americans, the 60 million illiterate people, the millions
of unemployed (as well as the under-employed), the 50% of the U.S.
population which is uninsured, or the 30 million people who are
under-fed and malnourished (Elias, 1991).

Indeed, Cuba could sim

ilarly charge that the U.S. is violating the political, social and
economic rights of many of its citizens.

However, as Elias (1991)

notes, for the U.S. to recognize these rights would require "funda
mental changes in the American system, which would upset its prevail
ing concentration of power and resources" (p. 258).
With regard to the Castro/Guevara-led revolution, it is clear
that initial U.S. concern was over the presence of economic democracy
(i.e., communism) in such geographic proximity to the United States.
As the U.S. Senate (1975) stated that
the fear of Communist expansion was particularly acute
in the United States when Fidel Castro emerged as Cuba's
leader in the late 1950s. His takeover was seen as the
first significant penetration by the Communists into the
Western Hemisphere. United States leaders, including most
Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem
the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These poli
cies rested on widespread popular support and encourage
ment (p. XIII).
This "infection" (U.S. Senate, 1975, p. XIII), apparently, was
something which could be cured through the illegal activities of the
CIA.

Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, the context in which the CIA

was created was conducive to the existence of an organization to
eliminate the threat of communism at any cost.

The often times false

connections between the early Cuba and the former Soviet Union made
these activities even more palatable to U.S. officials and their
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constituents at home.

Aggressive foreign policy (i.e., terrorism)

was justified as an attack against a Soviet threat.

If we didn't

stop "them" in Cuba, then the communists would be pouring into Key
'West, Florida.
Although the fear of the "domino effect" was great during the
Cold 'War, I would also suggest that a successful communist Cuba would
perhaps be an even greater threat to the U.S.

Given the fact that

Cuba was an extremely poor country when Castro seized control, any
success experienced in Cuba would challenge those persons in other
countries with more resources to ask, then,

"'Why not us?".

Nowhere

is this more evident than in the previously mentioned disinformation
about Cuba's progressive social accomplishments.

For all its alleged

human rights violations and economic shortcomings, Cuba has succeeded
in something which the U.S. has not:

providing universal health care

to all its citizens. Given then, the context of the Cold 'War, as well
as the sociopolitical climate, the economic structure, and the lati
tude the CIA was given during the Cold 'War, it should come as no
surprise that these terrorist activities have occurred.
I have attempted to address the issue of state-sponsored ter
rorism in a manner consistent with a critical approach to the study
of state criminality.

In this effort, an attempt has also been made

to demonstrate that state-sponsored terrorism must be defined in a
non-discriminatory manner to fully recognize the scope of the harm
caused by the U.S. toward Cuba.

If the word terrorism continues to

be confined to lesser acts of retail terrorism, primarily through
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ideological hegemony, then those greater harms caused by nation
states such as the U.S. will continue.

Certainly, those retail

terrorists which occupy so much U.S. concern, cause significantly
less harm than the anachronistic embargo which has caused much suf
fering to the Cuban people.

The introduction of the dengue virus,

the sponsoring of sabotage acts, assassination plots, the sponsoring
of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and the campaign of disinformation about
Cuba have all caused considerable harm as well.

Nevertheless, these

acts are not recognized by the U.S. as being either illegal, or forms
of terrorism.

As a matter of point, the doctrine of plausible denial

has insulated many of the policy makers from responsibility.
Although the definitional framework provided in this thesis is
not legally recognized by the U.S., the reasons why I have chosen
this definition are not without merit and are the logical extension
of both the social harms and legalistic approaches.

As stated ear

lier, the extant International Criminal Law on the matter of state
sponsored terrorism is based primarily on power considerations; both
the power to define other's actions as terrorist, and the power to
remove one's actions from consideration.

In short, the extant law on

the matter of state-sponsored terrorism allows a double standard to
exist.
This double standard, however, is not confined to interpreting
International Criminal Law.

Clearly, the U.S. has maintained a dou

ble standard in interpreting international definitions of human
rights.

On the one hand, the U.S. has increasingly used human rights
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violations as the reason for implementing and maintaining certain
foreign policy directives, while on the other hand the U.S. has not
codified many of those same human rights documents which they have
used to condemn others.

If the official U.S. stance on these human

rights documents were truly consistent, the U.S. would be in clear
violation of many of the economic rights enshrined in the interna
tional documents.

Kennedy's (1970) analysis of those creating state

law to define their own behavior as being beyond incrimination is
also applicable, it would appear, to the state defining its own beha
vior as beyond incrimination in the international community as well.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this research center around the data sources
used.

Indeed, the documents surrounding the eighth assassination

plot of Fidel Castro illustrate one of many classified documents
which I have not been able to obtain.

Conversely, I have not been

able to obtain any original documents from the Cuban government
either, aside from their response to the Dengue Fever epidemic which
was reprinted in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin.

Neverthe

less, I have attempted to use as many memoirs and participants' re
ports as possible to trace the development of U.S. state-sponsored
terrorism against Cuba.
Although I believe the area of state criminality provides pro
mise for those criminologists willing to turn a critical eye to the
activities of nation-states, I must state that data sources are
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difficult to obtain.

Moreover, these sources, as Chambliss (1993)

notes, must be examined cautiously.

Chambliss (1993) states that

government hearings, court trials, interviews, newspaper
accounts, and historical documents are replete with pro
blems of validity and reliability. In my view they are
no more so than conventional research methods in the
social sciences, but that does not alter the fact that
there is room for error in interpreting the findings. It
will require considerable imagination and diligence for
others to pursue research on this topic and add to the em
pirical base from which theoretical propositions can be
tested and elaborated (p. 311).
In reading these accounts, I have been aware of the fact that
the content of one person's writing may be totally contradicted by
that of another.

Admittedly, there have been times throughout this

research when I have struggled with the issue of whether or not my
research was, in fact, a truthful representation of what actually
happened.

During these times I would read and re-read these con

flicting sources in an attempt to find points of consensus, often
times drawing the conclusion that although one author's reasons as
to why an event occurred were different than another's, the occur
rence of the event in question was often not the issue.
The issue of researcher bias on my part must also be considered
here.

I indicated earlier that I have taken a critical approach to

this research.

In admitting that my approach has been critical in

nature, I do not believe that my research has been any more or less
biased.

Certainly, the direction in which my critical perspective

has taken me has been different from many others who have studied the
relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.

Nevertheless, I attempted to

follow a path consistent with answering a single research question:
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has the U.S. engaged in state-sponsored terrorism with respect to
Cuba?
Implications for Future Research
In examining the U.S. and Cuba, I have found evidence for many
other instances of state criminality on the part of the United
States.

As was mentioned earlier, the CIA has been investigated for

its involvement in the assassination plots of four other foreign
heads of state.

Certainly, the U.S. Senate Report contains enough

information about these plots to begin a research project of the U.S.
role in assassinations.

Also, I have found evidence that the mechan

isms of state-sponsored terrorism as defined by Herman (1987) were
also used in many other countries in this hemisphere, namely Brazil,
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, Chile, and
Argentina.

Moreover, outside this hemisphere, there is evidence to

suggest that countries such as Iran, Libya, the Congo, and South
Vietnam have also been the targets of U.S. state-sponsored terrorism.
Certainly, there is much to be done with respect to state-sponsored
terrorism within the field of criminology.
For critical criminologists, I think that the issue of state
sponsored terrorism illustrates well the patterns of violence which
others (e.g., Pepinsky, 1991; Tifft, 1979; Tifft & Markham, 1991; and
Tifft & Sullivan, 1980) have noticed.

Clearly, these criminologists

have laid the groundwork for understanding the connections between
interpersonal and structural violence and the institutions which
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maintain them.
I have alluded to the fact that the pattern of abuse in Cuba
is not dissimilar from that experienced in other countries.

Indeed,

the connections between both the ideological beliefs and institutions
which have caused harm to Cuba have caused harm in other countries,
as well as to persons within the United States.

Pepinsky's (1991)

work illustrates the similarities of the patterns of structural vio
lence (war) and interpersonal violence (crime).
work nicely elucidates

Although Pepinsky's

these patterns, Tifft and Markham (1991) pro

vide a highly illustrative example in their analysis of the battering
of women and Central Americans.

With reference to the process by

which the battering of women and Central Americans are similar, Tifft
and Markham (1991) state that
recognizing that violence, intimidation, exploitation,
dependency and diminishment have their genesis in the
core values and everyday social arrangements of our
society is a powerful awakening to the realities of
structural suffering, and the necessity for both per
sonal and social structural change (p. 114-115).
With reference to violence, Tifft and Markham (1991) also
recognize (as does Pepinsky) that it is systematic, ranging from the
structural down to the interpersonal.

Tifft and Markham (1991) note

that
systematic violence can only be understood in the context
of a society in which many accept and even encourage vio
lence as a means of resolving conflict, creating dependency,
and establishing dominance (p. 115).
Indeed, the patterns which Tifft and Markham (1991), speak of
fall within the theoretical framework of an institutional theory
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which is not bound in the false dichotomy of free-will and determin
ism.

For instance, the terrorist acts committed against Cuba, do, on

the interpersonal level, contain an element of free will.

However,

the structural conditions (i.e., sociopolitical and economic) as well
as the dominant ideology of the era (i.e., anti-communist sentiment
and the Cold War) created a situation in which terrorist foreign
policy was viewed as an acceptable means of dealing with an economic
threat.
In terms of future research, then, I would challenge other
criminologists to examine the role these institutions have played in
state-sponsored terrorism conducted by the U.S. since the end of
World War II.

I would also challenge them to examine these patterns

of violence in all arenas, particularly reference to the current vio
lent and repressive war with crime at home.
Concluding Remarks
To fully recognize the scope of the problem of terrorism, we
need to recognize that the U.S. has engaged in activities which are
indistinguishable from those which have been traditionally defined as
terrorists.
nature.

The key similarity of these activities is their violent

The key distinction, however, lies in the power to define

such activities as something other than what they are.

Following

from this, Herman (1987) notes that "in a sequence of violence, it
is often very difficult to determine where the process began, and
thus the distinction between terror and retaliation is often
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arbitrary and depends upon the ability of one side to establish its
claim by sheer power" (p. 3).

If, indeed, terrorism and counter

terrorism are arbitrary distinctions for forms of violence, and if
indeed the distinctions are politically partisan, then it is morally
and epistemologically unacceptable for criminologists to accept those
definitional distinctions which have been traditionally put forth
from Washington.

ENDNOTES
1.

It should be noted that others, outside the discipline of

criminology, have addressed this issue, such as Chomsky (1987; 1993),
Herman (1982; 1987), and Chomsky and Herman (1979).

While the works

of Chomsky and Herman will guide much of the analysis and application
in this paper, such work is recognized as limited regarding its lack
of application within the criminological literature.

It is hoped

that this analysis will aid in the development of such an interactive
approach to the analysis of U.S.-Cuba relations.
2.

Although there are other treaties and covenants which could

be considered here, they are primarily concerned with terrorism in
times of war.

Specifically, these treaties include the Geneva Con

vention (see article 3), and the Nuremberg Charter.
3.

Herman (1987) neither defines or discusses specific in

stances of invasion as a mechanism of state-sponsored terrorism.
Herman (1987) states that "invasions have been important but they are
relatively familiar and obvious in character and will not be dis
cussed further in this article" (p. 11).

Nevertheless, I have opted

to provide the reader with a working definition of invasions, as the
Bay of Pigs invasion will be discussed at length in Chapter III.
4.

This title is taken from the U.S. Select Senate Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 1975.
5.

Aside from the assassination attempts of Fidel Castro, the

CIA was also investigated by the U.S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Alleged Assassination Attempts of Foreign Leaders with respect
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to Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, General Rene Schneider of Chile, and Ngo Dinh Diem of South
Vietnam.
6.

Kuntz (1994) notes that these two indicators are used most

often by the United Nations agencies such as UNICEF and the World
Health Organization to assess a country's overall health status.
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